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AN EXAMINATION OF DISCRETE AND CONTINUOUS QUANTITY 





Advisor: Sara Cordes, Ph.D. 
 
 
The format of our quantity representations is a contentious topic of study in the 
field of numerical cognition with researchers debating whether we use discrete (i.e. 
number) or continuous (e.g. area, time, volume or density) cues to make quantity 
judgements. It has been proposed (through the Sense of Magnitude Theory) that 
continuous quantities are more perceptual in nature and thus do not require the higher 
order cognitive processes needed to represent abstract number, making it unlikely that 
number is tracked in the presence of perceptual quantities. In the current dissertation, I 
examined claims made by the Sense of Magnitude theory by 1) investigating the accuracy 
with which we represent continuous quantities and the mental processes we may engage 
in when representing these quantities and by, 2) comparing the relative salience of 
discrete and continuous quantities and how this may change across development. In 
Project 1, I investigated the accuracy with which infants make element size 
discriminations and whether this ability becomes more precise with age. Project 2 
examined the precision with which adults track cumulative area and uncover the process 
by which they do so. Lastly, Project 3 explored the relative salience of number for 
preschoolers by assessing their “Spontaneous Focusing on Number.” Together, findings 
from these three projects undermine claims stating that humans at all stages of 
development are better at, and prefer to, attend to continuous quantities over discrete 
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number. Instead I propose that this dissertation suggests that humans at all stages of 
development are strongly attuned to number in their environment. This work not only 
provides insight into the way we represent quantity in our day to day lives, but it can help 
us understand where individual difference in mathematical achievement in school may 
stem from.
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There is no doubt that human and non-human animals can represent quantities 
(Brannon, Lutz, & Cordes, 2006; Halberda & Feigenson, 2008d; Odic, Libertus, 
Feigenson, & Halberda, 2013; Xu & Spelke, 2000). However, the format of these 
representations and how we process these quantities at different stages of development is 
a much more contentious topic of study. There are a variety of dimensions of quantities 
we can represent – discrete quantity (i.e. number) and continuous quantities (e.g. area, 
time, volume or density) – and they are often strongly correlated with one another. For 
example, 8 cookies will not only be more numerous than 4 cookies, but 8 cookies will 
also take up a larger area on the plate, and the density of cookies compared to the empty 
space of the plate will also be greater. This inherent correlation between these different 
quantity dimensions means that it is difficult to determine which quantitative dimension 
infants, children, or adults might use when making quantity judgements, and it brings into 
question whether we can track these quantities independently of one another at all. 
Although a large amount of research has investigated our ability to represent discrete 
number, much less research has investigated our ability to represent continuous 
quantities. In order to paint a full picture of how infants, children, and adults represent 
quantity, it is important that we examine our abilities to represent both discrete and 
continuous quantities, independently of the others, as well as investigate the relative 
saliency of these different quantities. Given the lack of research investigating our abilities 
to represent continuous quantities, the current research aims not only to investigate more 
generally our ability to discriminate these continuous quantities, but I also examined the 
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ways in which number can interfere with our judgements of continuous quantity, and how 
the relative saliency of discrete and continuous quantities may impact our attention to 
number in the world. 
Theoretical framework 
Piaget was one of the first researchers to examine children’s understanding of 
quantities and also one of the first to suggest that number was simply too abstract of a 
concept for young children to grasp (Piaget, 1952, 1977). Instead Piaget suggested that 
children relied upon continuous quantities (also referred to as continuous extent) as a 
proxy for number. Since then a large body of research has continued to investigate the 
development of quantity understanding and the extent to which we use continuous and 
discrete cues to make quantity judgements. Proponents of the “Sense of Magnitude” 
(SoM) theory claim, similar to Piaget, that our abilities to track number are fully reliant 
upon an ability to track continuous quantities (Gebuis & Reynvoet, 2012b; Leibovich, 
Katzin, Harel, & Henik, 2017). They make this claim because they suggest that 
continuous cues are dependent on, and derived from, perceptual cues in nature (i.e. they 
are tied to a specific sensory modality) which makes them much easier to track than 
number which is abstract (i.e. we can track this regardless of the sensory modality). They 
further postulate that the abstract nature of number means that representing number 
requires many more higher order cognitive processes than tracking continuous quantities, 
and thus it is unlikely that number is tracked in the presence of perceptual quantities. 
Others claim that number is not too abstract for us to represent, citing evidence 
that has shown that even young infants are able to discriminate number at a very early 
age (Lipton & Spelke, 2003; Xu & Spelke, 2000). Furthermore, they find that infants are 
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in fact often more accurate at discriminating number compared to continuous quantities 
such as cumulative area or element size (Cordes & Brannon, 2011; M. E. Libertus, Starr, 
& Brannon, 2014).  
Given these two contradictory frameworks, it is important that I briefly examine 
what the literature has found so far with respect to our ability to discriminate both 
discrete and continuous quantities. 
Discrete Quantity Discrimination in Humans 
Most investigations of our ability to represent number have tested infants, 
children or adults on their ability to discriminate two different quantities (e.g., two set 
sizes, two amounts of cumulative area) from one another. In particular, given the strong 
correlation between number and continuous quantities, to investigate whether we can 
discriminate number independently of other quantities, a number of sophisticated designs 
have been developed that control for continuous cues isolating number as the only 
relevant cue. For example, in the infant literature on number discrimination, habituation 
studies have been developed where infants are presented with a series of displays, where 
the number of items in the display remains constant throughout habituation but where 
continuous cues such as the size of the dots, and thus the cumulative surface area and 
contour of the items vary across habituation. Then in test, infants are shown displays with 
either a novel or familiar number of items, while controlling for continuous variables. 
Similar designs with adults have also been developed: continuous quantities are varied in 
such a way that it makes relying upon continuous quantities when performing numerical 
discriminations, a less reliable strategy.  Using these designs, research has consistently 
shown that infants (Lipton & Spelke, 2003; Xu & Spelke, 2000), children (Halberda, 
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Mazzocco, & Feigenson, 2008; Odic, Le Corre, & Halberda, 2015; Odic et al., 2013), and 
adults (Odic et al., 2013) can use number alone to make discriminations between two sets 
of items, suggesting that number can be tracked independently of continuous quantities.  
Based on this literature, it has been determined that humans’ ability to 
discriminate number is ratio-dependent and improves with age. Although 6-month-old 
infants need as much as a 1:2 ratio of change between two sets of items to notice a 
change in number (M. E. Libertus & Brannon, 2010; Lipton & Spelke, 2003, 2004; Xu & 
Spelke, 2000; Xu, Spelke, & Goddard, 2005), by 9-10 months infants are able to 
discriminate a 2:3 ratio (M. E. Libertus & Brannon, 2010; Lipton & Spelke, 2003, 2004; 
Xu & Arriaga, 2007) and by the time children reach the age of 3 they can accurately 
discriminate a 3:4 ratio (Halberda & Feigenson, 2008b), with adults discriminating even a 
9:10 ratio (Odic et al., 2013). 
Continuous Quantity Discrimination in Humans  
The literature on number discrimination is quite extensive and suggests that 
humans can represent number independent of other continuous quantities. However, 
relatively less work has examined human’s ability to discriminate continuous quantities, 
and the findings from this literature are much more ambiguous. Taking a closer look at 
the infant literature, a few studies have used paradigms similar to that used with number, 
examining whether infants can discriminate using a single continuous dimension, while 
controlling for all other quantity dimensions. Studies on element size have for example 
found that 6-month olds were able to discriminate up to a 1:2 ratio, but not a 2:3 ratio in 
the size of a single Elmo face (Brannon et al., 2006). Similarly, 6-month-old infants are 
able to detect a 1:2 ratio of difference in the duration of a single visual or auditory 
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stimulus (Wynn & VanMarle, 2006). This suggests that infants can make continuous 
quantity (size or duration) discriminations at a similar level of accuracy as that of 
number, for single items.  
However, one key difference between these studies and those of number 
discrimination is that these element size studies have examined quantity discrimination in 
the context of a single item, while number discrimination studies by definition present 
stimuli in the context of sets. Therefore, taking a look at the few studies that have studied 
continuous extent discrimination, specifically when stimuli are presented in sets, the 
evidence is not as clear. Studies examining element size discrimination in the context of 
sets have found that 7-month olds need as much as a 4-fold change to detect a difference 
(Cordes & Brannon, 2011). Furthermore, studies examining other continuous dimensions 
have found that 7-month olds successfully detect a 4-fold but not a 3-fold change in 
cumulative area (Cordes & Brannon, 2008), and successfully detected a 3-fold but not a 
2-fold change in contour (Starr & Brannon, 2015). Thus at least with infants, the research 
suggests that, within the context of sets of items, infants are more precise at making 
numerical discriminations compared to continuous extent discriminations. Only when 
tracking continuous extent across a single item do infant’s abilities match their number 
discrimination abilities. In Project 1, I extended these findings by investigating element 
size discriminations in the context of sets at two different ages to determine whether, like 
number, element area discriminations become more precise with age.  
The evidence on continuous extent representations in children and adults is even 
sparser. Two studies did directly compare children’s and adult’s number and element size 
discriminations by presenting them either with two arrays of dots (number task) or a 
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single irregular shape that had two different color sections (area task) and asked 
participants to judge which color had more (Leibovich & Henik, 2014; Odic et al., 2013). 
Although children and adults were more accurate and had quicker reaction times for the 
area task compared to the number task – similar to many studies in the infant literature – 
they only assessed area discrimination in the context of a single item, making a 
comparison to numerical discriminations involving multiple items inappropriate. 
Although a few studies have examined the salience of CA in the context of multiple items 
(Barth, 2008; Hurewitz, Gelman, & Schnitzer, 2006), very few studies have 
systematically compared these tracking abilities to that of number.  
The Relative Salience of Discrete and Continuous Quantities  
One way we can begin to answer which dimension of quantity we represent most 
readily is to examine the relative saliency of these different dimensions and the ways in 
which these different quantities might interfere with one another. A line of work with 
adults has investigated this question by presenting adults with interference tasks where 
adults are presented with arrays of dots where discrete and continuous quantity are either 
congruent with one another (e.g. the larger number array has a larger cumulative area) or 
incongruent with one another (e.g. the larger number array has a smaller cumulative 
area). This allows researchers to test whether number interferes with cumulative area 
judgements or vice versa, whether cumulative area judgements interfere with number 
judgements. All previous studies using this type of paradigm have examined the ways in 
which continuous cues may interfere with number judgements, finding that adults 
perform worse on incongruent trials, suggesting that continuous dimensions interfere 
with discrete quantity judgements (Barth, 2008; DeWind & Brannon, 2012; Gebuis & 
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Reynvoet, 2012a; Hurewitz, Gelman, & Schnitzer, 2006). The few studies that have 
examined how number interferes with continuous extent judgements (Barth, 2008; 
Hurewitz, Gelman, & Schnitzer, 2006) have not systematically tested how different 
factors such as set size (the number of items in each array) or ratio (i.e. the ratio between 
the number of items in each array) affected performance. This is what I investigated in 
Project 2 by presenting adults with a cumulative area discrimination task in which I 
manipulated the set size and ratio of the arrays of items. By manipulating factors such as 
set size, I was also able to get a better sense of the mental processes by which adults track 
these different types of quantities (e.g. whether adults perform any type of mental 
computations to represent continuous quantities like cumulative area) and how the 
presence of one type of quantity may affect their representation of other quantities.  
Another way that we can begin to understand the relationship between our 
abilities to represent number and continuous extent is to investigate how salient these 
different dimensions are to humans. One line of work that has investigated the relative 
salience of quantitative information has examined the construct of “Spontaneous 
Focusing on Number” (SFON) which is usually defined as one’s propensity to focus on 
number without being prompted to do so. While most tasks examining SFON measure 
children’s tendency to use number words to describe a picture or the frequency with 
which children imitate the number of repetitive actions performed by an experimenter, 
more recent SFON tasks have specifically examined SFON when pitted against another 
quantitative dimension. In these match-to-sample type tasks, children can complete the 
task by either choosing to match based on number or another continuous dimension such 
as cumulative area, and greater matching using the dimension of number is considered as 
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evidence of children being more attuned to number in their environment, at least when 
pitted against continuous quantities. What is still unclear from this line of research is to 
what extent children’s SFON as measured in different types of tasks related to children’s 
actual knowledge about number. This is what I explored in Project 3. 
All in all, before we can make any claims about the ways in which humans 
represent quantity, we need not only investigate the accuracy with which we represent 
both discrete and continuous quantities, but it is also important that we investigate the 
relative salience of these different types of quantities, and how this may change across 
development. This will give us greater insight into how we inherently represent quantities 
and how we navigate our quantitative world.   
The Proposed Dissertation 
Although many studies have investigated infant’s, children’s, and adult’s abilities 
to represent discrete number, relatively little work has explored our abilities to represent 
continuous quantities such as element area or cumulative area, specifically in the context 
of sets. One prominent theory in the literature, the “Sense of Magnitude” theory has 
claimed that our abilities to track number (an abstract quantity) are fully reliant upon an 
ability to track continuous quantities, which are more perceptual in nature and thus do not 
require the higher order cognitive processes needed to represent abstract number (Gebuis 
& Reynvoet, 2012b; Leibovich et al., 2017). However, before we can make any claims 
about the ways we represent these different quantities, it is important that we have a 
thorough sense of infant’s, children’s, and adult’s acuity in representing these different 
quantities, specifically continuous quantities which have been examined relatively little 
in the literature. Additionally, it is important that we examine the relative saliency of 
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these different dimensions and the ways in which these different quantities might 
interfere with one another. 
Through the following three projects, I investigated human abilities to represent 
both discrete and continuous quantity, the mental processes they may have engaged in to 
represent continuous quantities, and the relative saliency of these quantities, across 
development. In doing this, I have also brought into question whether we truly rely on 
perceptual, continuous cues when tracking quantity, as the “Sense of Magnitude” theory 
has suggested (Gebuis & Reynvoet, 2012b; Leibovich et al., 2017). Below is a short 
outline of the three projects. 
Project 1: Tracking the size of one item among many: element area discrimination 
in infancy 
This project investigated the accuracy with which infants make element size 
discriminations. Only a few studies have examined continuous extent discriminations in 
infancy, and they suggest that while infants may be capable of discriminating relatively 
small (i.e., 2-fold ratio; (Brannon et al., 2006)) changes in element size when presented 
with a single item, when presented with an array of items, they are much less precise, 
requiring as much as a 4-fold change in order to detect change (Cordes & Brannon, 
2011). I replicated and extended these previous findings by exploring whether element 
area discriminations, like that of number, become more precise with age. In particular, I 
tested whether 7- and 12-month old infants succeed in detecting a 3-fold change in 
element area of items within an array and determined whether continuous extent 
discriminations become more precise with age. I found that 7-month olds failed and 12-
month old marginally succeeded at discriminating a 3-fold change in the element area of 
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items within an array suggesting that infants are not only starting off with a lower level of 
element area acuity at around 6-7 months of age compared to number (i.e., infants can 
discriminate a 2-fold change in number at this age; Xu & Spelke, 2000), but they are also 
improving at a much slower rate in tracking element area than for number. These findings 
further undermine claims that infants are better at discriminating continuous quantities 
compared to number. 
Project 2: The Impact of Set Size on Cumulative Area Judgements 
Although we know a lot about the precision with which humans discriminate 
number, less is known about how precisely we are capable of tracking cumulative area, 
and how numerical information may or may not interfere with this ability. The aim of this 
project was to determine the precision with which adults track cumulative area and to 
uncover the process by which they do so. I presented adults with arrays of dots (of 
differing set sizes) and asked them to judge the relative cumulative area of the displays. 
Two experiments were conducted for this project, with Experiment 1 controlling for item 
density (i.e. the number of items in the display per unit of the background) and 
Experiment 2 controlling for area density (i.e. the cumulative area of the items per unit of 
the background). This design allowed me to investigate the following research questions: 
(1) Does numerical congruency matter for cumulative area judgements?; (2) How does 
set size impact cumulative area representations?; and finally (3) By what process do 
adults represent cumulative area when presented with an array of items? Similar to the 
number discrimination literature, I found cumulative area judgements to be ratio-
dependent. More interestingly, however, I found that participants not only performed 
worse on trials where number was incongruent with cumulative area, but that adults 
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performed worse as set size increased. These findings suggest that number interferes with 
continuous quantity judgements, suggesting that it is at least as salient as continuous 
variables, undermining claims in the literature suggesting that continuous properties are 
easier to represent, and more salient to adults. 
Project 3: Relative Salience of Number: Preschooler’s Cardinal Knowledge Relates 
to Spontaneous Focusing On Number for Small, but not Large, Sets 
The final project of this dissertation examined the relative salience of number for 
preschoolers across different contexts, assessing their “Spontaneous Focusing on 
Number” (SFON). The main aim of this project was to examine the relation between 
children’s number knowledge abilities and SFON, to assess how dependent SFON may 
be upon a child’s ability to verbally encode the numbers presented. To do this, I 
manipulated multiple variables. First of all, given that prior studies have investigated 
SFON in the context of small sets exclusively, with no work exploring SFON in the 
context of large sets, my primary goal was to determine whether children’s SFON for 
small and large sets similarly relate to their knowledge of number. Second of all, given 
that many different tasks have been used to assess SFON that have distinct task demands 
(verbal vs. behavioral) and stimuli (different types and quantities of other features 
available to the child to focus on outside of number), I examined to what extent these 
tasks are measuring the same underlying construct. To do this, I presented preschoolers 
with four distinct SFON tasks assessing their spontaneous attention to number for small 
(Experiment 1) and large (Experiment 2) sets of numbers. Results not only revealed no 
relation in SFON performance across the four distinct SFON tasks, but I found 
preschooler’s SFON for small sets (1-4 items) to be significantly stronger than that for 
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large sets (10-40 items). Furthermore, analyses revealed that number knowledge was only 
associated with SFON for small sets, but not large. Together, these findings suggest that 
SFON may not be a set-size independent construct, and instead may hinge upon a child’s 
number knowledge, at least in the preschool years. 
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CHAPTER 1: TRACKING THE SIZE OF ONE ITEM AMONG MANY: 
ELEMENT AREA DISCRIMINATION IN INFANCY 
Abstract 
What quantitative properties infants represent when encountering a set of objects 
has been a topic for debate in the field of numerical cognition, with some suggesting that 
it should be easier to represent continuous quantities (that are perceptual in nature) than 
discrete number (which is not tied to any particular percept). Although we know that 
around 6-7 months of age, infant’s representations of number are more precise than that 
of continuous quantities (they can discriminate a 1:2 ratio of change in number, but fail at 
a 1:3 ratio of change in element area), it is unclear whether continuous quantity tracking 
becomes more precise over the course of development similar to numerical 
discriminations. In particular, do continuous tracking abilities “catch up” to number 
discrimination at some point in infancy? Thus, in the current study, we examined 7- and 
12-month-olds’ element area discriminations, to determine whether like number their 
element area discrimination precision increases with development. We found that 7-
month-olds failed to discriminate a 1:3 ratio of change in element area with only marginal 
success at this same ratio at 12 months of age. Therefore, even by 12 months, infant 
abilities to track element area are weak, and not anywhere near their numerical tracking 
capacities. Findings are discussed in light of claims made the Sense of Magnitude theory 
about how humans represent quantity. 
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Tracking the size of one items among many: element area discrimination in infancy 
What quantitative properties do infants represent when encountering a set of 
objects, such as rubber ducks in their bath? One possibility is that they track number, 
monitoring how many individual ducks are in the bathtub. Additionally, they could track 
the cumulative surface area, estimating how much total yellow they see in the water. Or, 
they could pay attention to the size of each individual duck. Which of these quantitative 
properties is most salient to infants is a question that has long been debated in the 
literature (Piaget, 1952, 1977).  
Historically, it has been suggested that number may be too abstract of a 
quantitative dimension for infants to track. Unlike continuous quantities which are 
“perceptual” in nature (i.e., dependent upon and tied to the percept), number can be 
tracked across multiple sensory modalities and is thought to be represented independent 
of perceptual qualities of the display (i.e. 3 ducks, 3 sounds, and 3 ideas are all instances 
of the number 3 even though each is associated with very distinct percepts). Proponents 
of the Sense of Magnitude (SoM) Theory have suggested that rather than tracking 
number (which presumably requires much higher order cognitive processes), infants are 
thought to rely upon perceptual, continuous quantities such as surface area or perimeter 
of visual items to track quantity (Henik, Leibovich, Naparstek, Diesendruck, & 
Rubinsten, 2011; Mix, Levine, & Huttenlocher, 1997).  
However, we now know this isn’t the case. A myriad of studies have examined 
infant number discrimination abilities, finding that preverbal infants can track number 
even as newborns (Coubart, Izard, Spelke, Marie, & Streri, 2014; Izard, Sann, Spelke, & 
Streri, 2009), and that they do so even when all other continuous quantitative cues are 
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controlled (Xu & Spelke, 2000; Xu et al., 2005). On the other hand, although a 
substantial amount of research has examined infant numerical abilities, much less is 
known about the developmental trajectory of infant abilities to track continuous 
quantities. The few studies that have examined this question have found that around 6-7 
months of age, infants are relatively poor discriminators of cumulative area (CA) and 
element area (EA) compared to their numerical discrimination abilities (Brannon, Abbott, 
& Lutz, 2004; Cordes & Brannon, 2008, 2011; M. E. Libertus et al., 2014). However, this 
previous work has focused on continuous quantity tracking only in 6-7 month olds. 
Although we know that numerical discrimination abilities become more precise over the 
course of development, it is unknown whether continuous quantity tracking increases in 
parallel, and in particular, whether at some point in infancy continuous tracking abilities 
may “catch up” to number discrimination in infancy. Thus, in the current study, we 
examined 7-month olds’ (to replicate prior work) and 12-month-olds’ (to extend this 
work to an older age range) EA discriminations, to determine whether like number their 
EA discrimination precision increases with development.  
One recurring problem in the literature examining infant quantitative 
discrimination abilities is that because discrete (i.e. number) and continuous (e.g. 
cumulative area, density, element area) quantitative properties are highly correlated with 
one another, it is difficult to determine which quantitative dimension infants attend to. 
This has led researchers to design paradigms that isolate one quantitative dimension (e.g. 
number) while controlling for the others (e.g. CA, EA or density). For example, to assess 
infant number discrimination abilities independent of continuous variables, habituation 
studies have presented infants with displays where the number of items remains identical 
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across habituation trials but the element area (and thus cumulative area and contour 
length) of the items varies across displays, making these continuous variables unreliable 
cues for tracking (e.g., Xu & Spelke, 2000). The use of this type of paradigm has led to 
the discovery that while 6-month-old infants are able to make numerical discriminations 
of a 1:2 ratio (e.g. 8 vs. 16 items), they fail at a 2:3 ratio (e.g. 8 vs. 12 items; Lipton & 
Spelke, 2004; Wynn & VanMarle, 2006; Xu & Spelke, 2000; Xu, Spelke, & Goddard, 
2005), suggesting that the ease with which infants compare two sets of items depends on 
the ratio between them. Furthermore, by 9 months of age, infants succeed at detecting a 
2:3 ratio change in number (Wood & Spelke, 2005; Xu & Arriaga, 2007), and by 3 or 4 
years, children successfully discriminate a 3:4 ratio (Odic et al., 2013), indicating that 
with age and experience, children are able to discriminate smaller ratios of change in 
number.  
Despite the evidence showing that infants can use number alone to track 
quantities, some theorists continue to believe that in actuality, infants, children and adults 
rely on perceptual continuous quantities such as EA or CA when estimating or tracking 
number (Gebuis & Reynvoet, 2012a, 2012b; Leibovich et al., 2017; Mix, Huttenlocher, & 
Levine, 2002).These claims come from research revealing that numerical estimates (in 
children and adults) are impacted by changes in the continuous perceptual qualities of a 
display, such that e.g., an array of 10 items may be judged to have more items if the 
individual items within the array are smaller in size (Ginsburg & Nicholls, 1988; Tokita 
& Ishiguchi, 2010, 2013). Although it is undisputed that continuous quantities may bias 
numerical estimates, it is debated whether these biases reflect an inherent reliance upon 
continuous cues (instead of number; Leibovich et al., 2017) or instead an inability to 
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inhibit attention to irrelevant quantitative information when tracking number (Cantrell, 
Boyer, Cordes, & Smith, 2015; Cantrell & Smith, 2013). This is where the infant work 
becomes relevant. 
If it was the case that numerical abilities were dependent upon tracking of 
continuous quantities, we would expect infant abilities to discriminate area (and other 
continuous quantities) to be comparable to, or even more precise than, that of number. 
That is, given that infants can discriminate a 1:2 ratio of change in number at 6 months, 
we would expect this same age group to also be able to discriminate 1:2 ratio of change 
in area. Note, however, given claims that infants rely upon continuous quantities when 
tracking number – in the context of sets of objects – it is important to assess infant 
abilities to track continuous quantities using comparable stimuli – that is, in the context 
of sets of objects. Only a handful of studies have examined the acuity of infant 
discriminations of continuous properties in the context of sets, and the ones that have 
suggest that infants are relatively poor discriminators of continuous extent in numerical 
contexts. For example, when CA is the sole relevant cue for discrimination (i.e., number 
and other continuous cues are controlled for), 6-month olds have been found to require as 
much as a 4-fold change in CA to detect a change (Brannon et al., 2004; Cordes & 
Brannon, 2008; M. E. Libertus et al., 2014). This low precision is remarkable given that 
infants of this age are able to track a 2-fold change in number. Thus, 6-month old infants 
are able to track number with significantly greater precision than changes in CA, 
contradicting claims of a Sense of Magnitude Theory (Leibovich et al., 2017). 
However, it may be that CA discriminations are particularly difficult because 
representing cumulative area requires tracking surface area across multiple sets of 
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objects, a process which could potentially require the engagement of a computation 
process (e.g. summing across all the items in the array to get a total estimate). If that is 
the case, one would imagine that tracking the size of an individual object within the 
context of an array of objects should be a significantly simpler process since it should not 
involve any computational processing – simply the representation of area of a single item. 
While it is true that research has revealed that 6-7-month-old infants can discriminate the 
area of a single item (presented in isolation) with comparable precision to that of their 
number tracking abilities (i.e., they can detect a 1:2 ratio change in EA, but not a 2:3 ratio 
– identical patterns as that found with number in this age group; Brannon, Lutz, & 
Cordes, 2006; see Feigenson, 2005 for a review) – research involving sets of objects have 
provided less support for SoM. Only one study to date has done this, and unlike the 
findings with a single element, Cordes and Brannon (2011) found that 7-month-olds 
failed to discriminate 1:3 ratio of EA when presented in the context of an array of items. 
In fact, infants needed as much as a 1:4 ratio of change to detect a difference. This 
finding is particularly surprising given that (in theory) the task demands should be 
identical whether infants are asked to track the area of a single element when it is 
presented singly, or in the context of an array of items; to succeed infants need only pay 
attention to the size of one item in the set. In practice, however, it seems that EA 
discriminations prove significantly more challenging for infants in the context of a set of 
items.  
Together, the few studies that have examined continuous extent discriminations in 
infancy suggest that they are remarkably poor at using area alone to track quantity. 
Notably, however, since these studies have only tested infants around 6-7 months of age, 
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it is unclear whether infants show a similar developmental trajectory in their area 
discriminations compared to number. If, as proponents of the Sense of Magnitude Theory 
suggest, continuous quantities are easier to discriminate than number, we would not only 
expect infants to discriminate EA with similar (or better) precision than number, but we 
would expect a parallel increase in acuity with age, similar to what we see in number. In 
terms of number, we know that infants can discriminate a 1:2 ratio of change at 6 months 
and a 2:3 ratio at 9 months. In terms of element area, previous studies suggest that they 
fail to discriminate a 1:3 ratio at 7 months, yet it is still unclear whether they improve in 
their area tracking abilities over the infancy period, and whether their area tracking 
abilities may eventually “catch up” to that of their numerical tracking abilities. In the 
current study, we examined the developmental trajectory of infant EA discriminations to 
determine whether infants improve in their EA discriminations with age. To do this, we 
tested 7- and 12-month-old infants on an EA discrimination task where both age groups 
were presented with a 1:3 ratio of change in area – a ratio of change 7 month olds have 
previously been shown to fail to detect. Replicating prior findings, we expected 7-month-
olds to again fail to notice a 1:3 ratio of change (Cordes & Brannon, 2011); however, if 
infant area discriminations – like that of number – improve over the course of 
development and even potentially catch up to their numerical tracking abilities – we 
predicted that 12 month olds should succeed in detecting a 1:3 ratio of change. 
Methods 
Participants 
Twenty 7-month olds (M = 6m29d, Range = 6m16d – 7m13d) and twenty 12-
month olds (M = 12m4d, Range = 11m17d – 12m24d) participated in this study. An 
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additional ten 7-month olds were excluded due to: parental or sibling interference (N=2), 
technical problems (N=2) or not finishing at least 4 out of 6 test trials (N=6). 
Furthermore, an additional eight 12-month olds were excluded for parental or sibling 
interference (N=2) or not finishing at least 4 out of 6 test trials (N=6). 
Apparatus 
Stimuli were presented on one 19’’ inch computer monitor mounted on a black 
wall in a dimly lit room. Infants sat in a highchair or on their parent’s lap facing the 
monitor, approximately 20” from the screen, with the video camera recording the infant’s 
looking towards the monitor. For the purposes of online coding, a recording of the 
infant’s face was presented on a large TV monitor in a separate experimental room. 
Using a gamepad, the online coder recorded the infant’s eye gaze throughout the duration 
of the study. For the purposes of offline coding, the recording of the infant’s face as well 
as a recording of the stimuli the infant saw was multiplexed and recorded using digital 
recording software. 
Design 
All infants were habituated to homogeneous sets of dots that were identical in EA. 
Across trials, the EA of the dots was kept constant, but the number of dots in each display 
varied (and thus CA of the arrays varied from trial-to-trial too). Following habituation, 
infants were presented with six test trials that alternated between two types: 1) novel EA 
trials, where the EA of the dots involved a 3-fold increase (or decrease, dependent upon 
condition) compared to habituation or, 2) familiar EA trials, where the EA of the dots 
was identical to those in habituation. The number of items in the two arrays differed from 
the average number of items in habituation by an equal proportion – making number an 
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irrelevant cue for discrimination. Moreover, the CA of the two test arrays were equated, 
making CA an irrelevant cue as well. Whether participants’ first test trial was novel or 
familiar was counterbalanced across participants. Additionally, as in Cordes & Brannon, 
2011, for the novel test trials, half of participants were presented with trials where the 
novel arrays involved a 3-fold decrease in element area (Test Condition A), while the 
other half of participants were presented with novel arrays that involved a 3-fold increase 
in element area (Test Condition B). 
Procedure 
Infants were first presented with a short attractor video to orient them to the 
computer monitor. Once they looked at the attractor video for at least 2 consecutive 
seconds, they began the habituation portion of the experiment. During habituation, each 
display was presented until either 1) the infants had looked a minimum of .5 seconds to 
the display and then looked away for 2 consecutive seconds or 2) the infants had looked 
to the display for a maximum of 60 seconds. Infants moved to test once they met the 
habituation criteria, such that looking during the last three trials had declined 50% 
compared to the first three habituation trials in which the infant had looked for a total of 
at least 12 seconds (as per Cordes & Brannon, 2009, 2011; Xu & Spelke, 2000). Infants 
were presented with a minimum of 6 habituation trials and a maximum of 16 trials. If 
infants had still not met the habituation criteria after the maximum 16 habituation trials, 
they moved onto test anyway. There were a total of 6 different habituation stimuli that 
were presented in blocks such that each of the 6 stimuli were presented once before the 
set repeated a second time. The order of the trials within each block was randomized.  
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In test, infants were shown 6 test trials, alternating between novel and familiar test 
trials. Identical to habituation, the stimuli remained on the monitor until the infant looked 
to the display for a minimum of .5 seconds and then looked away for 2 consecutive 
seconds or if the infant looked to the display for a total of 60 seconds.  
Stimuli 
All dot arrays were green dots on a white background, created with Adobe 
Illustrator CS5 Software (See Figure 1.1 for stimuli). In habituation, each dot had an 
element area of 3cm2, with the number of dots used for each display spaced 
logarithmically between 6-30 dots, averaging out to 15.67 dots per display and thus with 
an average CA of 47cm2. In test, the number of dots in the display (8 or 24 dots) was 
approximately equidistant from the number of dots in habituation. Thus, for participants 
in Test Condition A (where the novel test display involved a 3-fold decrease in EA), the 
familiar test trials contained 8 dots of 3cm2 and the novel displays contain 24 dots of 
1cm2, resulting in a CA of both test displays being 24cm2. For participants in Test 
Condition B (where the novel test display involved a 3-fold increase in EA), the familiar 
test trials contained 24 dots that were each 3cm2 and the novel displays contain 8 dots 
that were each 9cm2, resulting in a CA of 72cm2 for both types of test displays. The 
background display size was identical across habituation and test, making the density of 













Data Processing & Coding  
All videos were coded online by one experienced coder blind to the experimental 
condition, and offline by a second blind coder using Preferential Looking Coder (K. 
Libertus, 2008), a program that codes each frame (100ms) of the video. If reliability 
between these coders was less than 85% overall, or if any individual test trial reliability 
was less than 85%, a third coder recoded the video offline. Reliability was then calculated 






Figure 1.1 Sample stimuli  
Infants were habituated to arrays that were constant in EA, but that varied in number and 
CA. In test, infants were presented with displays that were the same EA as in 
habituation (familiar displays) and displays that changed in EA by a 3-fold change. Test 




was used for data analysis. Using this coding system, reliability between coders was 
found to be 94.7%. 
Looking times that were longer than 3 standard deviations away from the mean 
were treated as outliers and were replaced with the next longest looking time that was 
within 3 standard deviations (as per Cordes & Brannon, 2009, 2011).  
Results 
7-month olds 
A paired samples t-test revealed that infants significantly reduced their looking 
from the first three (M = 10.62, SE = 1.39) to last three habituation trials (M = 6.57, SE = 
.89; t(19) = 2.63 , p = .02). Seven babies met the habituation criterion.  
A 2 x 2 repeated measures ANOVA testing the within-subjects factor of Test 
Trial Type (Novel or Familiar) and the between-subjects’ factor of Test Condition 
(Decrease in Size vs Increase in Size) found no main effect of either Test Trial Type 
(F(1,18) = .08, p = .78 , ηp2 = .004) or Test Condition (F(1,18) = .28, p < .59 , ηp2 = .02), 
nor any interaction (F(1,18) = .44, p = .52 , ηp2 = .02; See Figure 1.2). Only 9 out of 20 
infants looked longer to the novel test trials, which was not significantly different from 
chance (p = .75, Binomial statistic). Replicating prior research Cordes & Brannon (2011) 
our findings reveal that 7-month olds failed to detect a 3-fold change in EA in the context 
of sets.  
12-month olds 
We again ran a paired samples t-test and found a significant reduction in looking 
from the first three (M = 6.72, SE = .55) to last three habituation trials (M = 3.86, SE = 
.49; t(19) = 4.11 , p < .001). Eleven babies met the habituation criteria.  
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A 2 x 2 repeated measures ANOVA testing the within-subjects factor of Test 
Trial Type (Novel or Familiar) and the between-subjects’ factor of Test Condition 
(Decrease in Size vs Increase in Size) found a marginal main effect of Test Trial Type 
(F(1,18) = 2.95, p = .10 , ηp2 = .14) and a significant effect of Test Condition (F(1,18) = 
190.99, p < .001 , ηp2 = .91) such that participants had longer looking times (M = 6.38, SE 
= .54) overall in the Increasing condition (when the items in test were 3 times larger than 
those in habituation) compared to the decreasing condition (M = 4.26, SE = .54; when the 
items in test were 3 times smaller than those in habituation). There was no significant 
Test Trial Type by Test Condition interaction (F(1,18) = .47, p = .50 , ηp2 = .03). 
Importantly, 15 out of 20 infants looked longer to the novel test trials (p = .02, 
Binomial statistic) which was significantly above chance. Furthermore, when we looked 
at the first pair of test trials, we did find that infants looked significantly longer to the first 
novel (M = 7.49, SE = 1.05) compared to the first familiar test trial (M = 5.15, SE = .68; 
t(19) = 2.07, p = .053 , d = .46) although this was not the case for the second or third pair 
of test trials (p’s > 29). This suggests that although infants as a group only revealed a 
marginal preference in looking towards the novel test trial, when examining the first test 
trials alone infants did show a stronger preference for the novel test trials. Additionally, 
individually a significant majority of infants looked longer to the novel test trials. 
Although we do not have strong evidence for 12-month olds successfully 
discriminating a 3-fold change in EA, this ability does seem to have improved marginally 
with age.  
Combined Analysis 
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Next, we conduct an omnibus ANOVA testing the within-subjects factor of Test 
Trial Type (novel or familiar) and the between-subjects factor of Age Group (7 or 12 
months). Similar to our findings with each age group separately, there was no main effect 
of Test Trial Type (F(1,18) = 1.86, p = .18 , ηp2 = .05), nor was there a main effect of Age 
Group (F(1,18) = .28, p = .60, ηp2 = .01). However, there was a (barely) marginally 
significant interaction between these two variables (F(1,18) = 2.72, p = .11, ηp2 = .07).  
Discussion 
Although a myriad of studies have examined infant abilities to make numerical 
discriminations, less is known about the developmental trajectory of infant abilities to 
Figure 1.2. Mean looking times for the novel and familiar test trials for 7- and 12-month 






















track continuous quantities such as cumulative or element area. This is particularly 
relevant given that proponents of the Sense of Magnitude (SoM) Theory suggest that 
infants rely on perceptual, continuous quantities to track quantities (Gebuis & Reynvoet, 
2012a; Henik et al., 2011; Leibovich et al., 2017; Mix et al., 1997) and, as such, should 
be better at discriminating continuous quantities than number. If so, we would not only 
expect infants to be able to discriminate smaller ratios of change for EA than that of 
number, but they should also demonstrate improvements in their EA discrimination 
abilities during infancy, at the very least at the same pace as that of number.  
In the current study, we provided the first test of infant EA discrimination abilities 
at two different developmental time points: 7 and 12 months. We found that at 7-months, 
infants failed to discriminate a 1:3 ratio of change in EA, replicating previous findings 
(Cordes & Brannon, 2011). At 12 months, however, the data area somewhat mixed, 
revealing marginal success in detecting a 3-fold change in EA. While the findings are not 
robust, the implications are. Importantly, it is clear that even by 12 months of age, infant 
abilities to track EA are weak, and not anywhere near their numerical tracking capacities.  
Prior research suggests that infants at this age are able to discriminate a 2:3 ratio change 
in number (or possibly even finer ratios, Lipton & Spelke, 2003), suggesting that they are 
almost 200% more precise at discriminating changes in number compared to EA. 
Furthermore, this means that infants not only start off with a lower level of area tracking 
acuity in early infancy (around 6-7 months of age), but their precision in area tracking 
improves at a much slower rate than that of number over the course of the infant period.   
All in all, these findings further undermine claims made by the SoM theory 
positing that infants rely upon perceptual quantities, such as EA, instead of number to 
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track quantities (Gebuis & Reynvoet, 2012a; Henik et al., 2011; Leibovich et al., 2017; 
Mix et al., 1997). Not only does previous research suggest that infants can make 
numerical discriminations independent of continuous cues (Lipton & Spelke, 2003; Xu & 
Spelke, 2000; Xu et al., 2005), our research (together with others: Brannon et al., 2004; 
Cordes & Brannon, 2009, 2011; Starr & Brannon, 2015) reveals that infants are 
remarkably poor trackers of continuous quantities in the context of numerical sets. As 
such, it seems highly unlikely that infants would resort to tracking continuous quantities 
over number when presented with a set of objects.  
How do we interpret the finding that infants are able to discriminate EA with a 
higher level of precision when presented with a single item (Brannon et al., 2006), 
compared to when presented with an array of items? In theory, the process by which 
children complete these tasks should be the same; to succeed infants need only pay 
attention to the size of one item, whether or not those items are presented in the context 
of an array of items or as a single item. In practice, however, EA discriminations become 
much more difficult in the context of a set of items. Why might this be the case? One 
possibility is that the presence of multiple items in an array encourages infants to pay 
attention to all items, and this spreading of attention across items takes away from the 
level of attention they pay to any single item, decreasing their precision in representing 
EA. Another possibility is that the mere presence of multiple items encourages infants to 
focus on quantitative features that pertain to the set as a whole, such as the number of 
items in the set or their CA (although this seems unlikely given previous evidence 
showing that infants are also poor discriminators of CA; Brannon et al., 2004; Cordes & 
Brannon, 2008). However, since infants are not given any reliable cues for number or CA 
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during the habituation trials, they fail to form a coherent representation of items in 
habituation which leads to failure to dishabituate to the novel display in test. That is, 
changes in number across the sets may, in fact, detract from EA discriminations in this 
context. Future work would benefit from addressing to what extent the size of the set 
(whether presented with a single item or an array of items) may affect how infants 
represent quantity.  
The current study provides further evidence in the longstanding debate as to 
which quantitative dimensions are most salient to infants: number or continuous 
quantities. Not only did we replicate previous findings showing that infants start off with 
a lower level of EA acuity at 6-7 months compared to that of number (failing at a 1:3 
ratio for EA but succeeding at a 1:2 ratio for number; Xu & Spelke, 2000), we also 
demonstrated that infants improve at a slower rate for EA discriminations compared to 
that of number. Our findings, along with others from the previous literature, continue to 
undermine claims made by SoM theory, instead providing strong support for the idea that 
infants may, in fact, rely upon number when tracking quantity.   
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CHAPTER 2: THE IMPACT OF SET SIZE ON CUMULATIVE AREA 
JUDGEMENTS 
Abstract 
The ability to track number has long been considered more difficult than tracking 
continuous quantities. Evidence for this claim comes from work revealing that continuous 
properties (specifically cumulative area) influence numerical judgements, such that adults 
perform worse on numerical tasks when cumulative area is incongruent with number. If 
true, then continuous extent tracking abilities should be relatively precise, and unimpeded 
by numerical features. However, few studies have directly examined this hypothesis by 
characterizing adult abilities to discriminate arrays on the basis of continuous quantities. 
The aim of the present study was to determine the precision with which adults track 
cumulative area and to uncover the process by which they do so. We presented adults 
with arrays of dots (of differing set sizes) and asked them to judge the relative cumulative 
area of the displays. Similar to the number discrimination literature, we found cumulative 
area judgements to be ratio-dependent. More interestingly, however, we found that 
participants not only performed worse on trials where number was incongruent with 
cumulative area, but that adults performed worse as set size increased. These findings 
suggest that number interferes with continuous quantity judgements, suggesting that it is 
at least as salient as continuous variables, undermining claims in the literature suggesting 
that continuous properties are easier to represent, and more salient to adults. 
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The Impact of Set Size on Cumulative Area Judgements 
Representing quantity is an important skill for human and non-human animals 
alike. Whether you are a human deciding just how many apples you will need to make 
your favorite apple pie, or a mosquitofish deciding where in the ocean you can find the 
highest density of zooplankton, the ability to represent approximate quantities is 
important for day-to-day life. However, which quantities we rely upon for these 
important decisions has been a topic of debate (Gebuis & Reynvoet, 2012a; Leibovich et 
al., 2017; Savelkouls & Cordes, 2017). Human and non-human animals can represent 
discrete quantity (i.e. number; Humans: e.g., Halberda & Feigenson, 2008; Non-human 
animals: e.g., Brannon & Terrace, 1998; Meck & Church, 1983) but they can also 
represent continuous quantities (also referred to as continuous extent1) such as area, 
volume, length or density (Humans: e.g., Brannon, Lutz, & Cordes, 2006; Odic, 2018; 
Non-human animals: e.g., Boysen, Berntson, & Mukobi, 2001). Furthermore, these 
discrete and continuous quantities are strongly correlated with one another: e.g., 10 
apples are not only more numerous than 5 apples, but their cumulative volume, weight, 
surface area, and density are also greater. This naturally strong correlation between 
discrete and continuous variables has led researchers to question the extent to which we 
track these quantities independently of each other. 
A majority of the research investigating humans’ quantitative abilities has focused 
on our ability to represent discrete number. While substantial research has supported the 
idea that infants, children, and adults are remarkably good at representing number 
(Halberda & Feigenson, 2008a; Odic et al., 2015; Xu & Spelke, 2000), not everyone 
																																																								
1 Note: For the purposes of this paper, “continuous quantity” will exclusively refer to 
visual quantities, not e.g., time.   
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agrees. Proponents of the “Sense of Magnitude” (SoM) theory take a neo-Piagetian 
approach to number representation, suggesting that our abilities to track number are fully 
reliant upon an ability to track continuous quantities (Gebuis & Reynvoet, 2012b; 
Leibovich et al., 2017). The premise of this argument is that continuous quantities such as 
element area (EA), cumulative area (total area of all items in an array; CA) or density 
(the ratio of the number/area of items and the size of the display) are derived from and 
dependent upon the perceptual qualities of the display, and thus are significantly easier to 
track than number. In contrast, number is considered to be an abstract quantity –it can be 
tracked using many different sensory modalities (vision, sound and even touch), and even 
compared across modalities (e.g. it is possible to compare the number of voices heard to 
the number of people seen). As such, the ability to track number has been considered to 
involve much higher order cognitive processes than tracking continuous quantities, 
making it unlikely that number is tracked in the presence of other perceptual quantities. 
As a direct test of these claims, researchers have investigated whether we can 
track number independent of continuous properties. Although substantial work reveals 
that continuous properties can bias numerical judgements (Gebuis & Reynvoet, 2012a; 
Hurewitz et al., 2006; Leibovich, Henik, & Salti, 2015), researchers have successfully 
developed paradigms that systematically control for continuous properties that typically 
correlate with number, providing strong evidence that humans are capable of tracking 
number independent of continuous perceptual variables (Halberda & Feigenson, 2008b; 
Lipton & Spelke, 2003; Odic et al., 2013; Starr, Libertus, & Brannon, 2013a; Xu & 
Spelke, 2000; Xu et al., 2005). However, less work has explored the converse; that is, 
how well can we track continuous properties independent of number? Are continuous 
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properties easier to track? Notably, as posited by the SoM theory, numerical abilities 
would only be dependent upon continuous extent tracking if and only if continuous extent 
representations are more precise and more salient than numerical ones. If our abilities to 
track continuous properties are less refined than our abilities to track number, then it is 
unlikely that we would rely upon less precise continuous representations. Although a 
myriad of studies have examined number discrimination abilities in the context of 
competing continuous extent information (Barth, 2008; DeWind & Brannon, 2012; 
Gebuis & Reynvoet, 2012a; Hurewitz, Gelman, & Schnitzer, 2006), little research has 
directly examined our abilities to discriminate arrays on the basis of continuous quantity 
in the context of competing numerical information. The aim of the present study was to 
examine adult abilities to discriminate CA across arrays with differing numerical 
information. We had two goals: (1) to determine the precision with which adults track 
CA across various set sizes and (2) to investigate if and how CA discriminations are 
influenced by numerical information. That is, we aimed to understand the process by 
which we track continuous quantities – are CA representations dependent upon number? 
This latter question is of theoretical importance because it can speak to how our 
representations of number and continuous quantities may be related. 
How well do adults discriminate CA? 
Most studies that have examined adult CA tracking abilities have used 
discrimination or numerical Stroop type tasks. In these types of tasks, on some trials 
continuous properties and number are incongruent with one another (e.g. the array with a 
greater number of items has a smaller CA) and on other trials, number and continuous 
properties are congruent (e.g. the array with the greater number of items also has a 
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greater CA). Although explicit instructions are to judge the relative numerosity of the 
displays (i.e., not to attend to cumulative area), multiple studies have found that adults 
consistently perform worse on incongruent compared to congruent trials (Barth, 2008; 
DeWind & Brannon, 2012; Gebuis & Reynvoet, 2012a; Hurewitz, Gelman, & Schnitzer, 
2006). This has been taken as evidence that even when given explicit instructions to pay 
attention to number, adults automatically process continuous properties of the set (even 
when irrelevant to the task). These findings have provided the basis for claims that 
continuous perceptual properties are more readily and precisely tracked than number.  
However, is it true that adults track CA with relatively greater precision than that 
of number? If numerical judgements were fully dependent upon continuous properties, 
then one would expect our ability to track continuous quantities to be more refined than 
that of number. That is, humans should be at least as good at discriminating arrays based 
upon continuous quantities as they are at discriminating arrays based upon number. 
However, very few studies have specifically examined adult abilities to discriminate 
continuous properties. A handful of studies have compared area and numerical tracking 
abilities in infants, children, and adults reporting similar, or even more precise, abilities 
to discriminate the area of a single item relative to their abilities to discriminate number 
(Brannon et al., 2006; Leibovich & Henik, 2014; Odic et al., 2013). Yet, critically, the 
only way to address claims (such as those made by SoM theory) that continuous extent is 
more readily tracked over number is to examine the precision of CA representations in 
the context of sets where numerical information is available. Importantly, these studies 
have found performance costs for incongruent trials such that CA judgements are less 
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accurate when number is incongruent with CA (Barth, 2008; Hurewitz et al., 2006)2 . 
That is, number may be just as salient as number in the context of sets3.  
There is some evidence to suggest that continuous quantity discriminations may 
be less precise than numerical discriminations, at least in human infants. Studies that 
have investigated 6-7-month-olds’ abilities to track the size of individual objects (element 
area, or EA) when presented in the context of an array of items, or the CA of an array of 
items have found that infants needed as much as a 1:4 ratio of change in both EA and CA 
to detect a change. This 1:4 ratio of change is notably greater than the 1:2 ratio of change 
necessary to detect changes in number (Brannon et al., 2004; Cordes & Brannon, 2008, 
2011). In sum, the infant literature suggests that infants are better at tracking number than 
continuous dimensions in the context of sets.  
However, research with infants presents some limitations that make it difficult to 
fully uncover the extent of human CA representations. First of all, infant measures of 
quantity discrimination are always implicit (i.e. one cannot give infants any instructions 
as to what they should do in a task), thus one has little control over what they are doing in 
a task. It is impossible to be explicit about task demands to the infant, confounding 
salience of a dimension with precision. That is, it is conceivable that infants are 
																																																								
2 Barth (2008) ran additional models of the data and concluded that this decreased 
performance in incongruent trials was not due to interference between the two 
dimensions of number, but instead could be explained by the fact that participants 
underestimated individual element areas resulting in more difficult discriminations. 
Importantly, we highlight that these findings are consistent with claims that area 
judgements are more difficult than numerical ones.  
3 Note Hurewitz et al. (2006) reported CA interfered with numerical judgements more so 
than number interfered with CA judgements. Importantly, however, the authors did not 
systematically match the ratio of change across the two dimensions, such that numerical 
differences across displays may have been significantly smaller (and thus less salient) 
than CA differences. As such, it is inappropriate to judge relative salience of the two 
quantities.  
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incredibly precise trackers of CA, but simply less likely to focus on this dimension in 
general. Secondly, infant’s limited attention abilities mean that researchers can only 
present infants with a few trials, which limits the types of questions researchers can 
answer. Questions regarding whether changes in number may influence CA tracking 
abilities and/or how precisely we can track small changes in CA are not addressable with 
this population. Moreover, CA tracking abilities may change over the course of 
development, likely due to changes in maturation, other domain-general abilities (i.e., 
working memory, attention), and visual acuity, making it important to investigate CA 
tracking in adult populations in addition to younger populations.  
Processes involved in CA representation 
So how do we represent CA when presented with an array of items? The previous 
literature has presented us with two mutually exclusive theoretical possibilities.  
One possibility, which we will refer to as the ‘Direct Perception’ hypothesis, is 
consistent with assumptions of the Sense of Magnitude (SoM) theory. According to the 
Direct Perception hypothesis we are able to track surface area directly from the 
perception – that is, we directly perceive exactly how much area is covered just as readily 
as we notice the color or luminance of the items. Importantly, this direct abstraction does 
not require extensive cognitive processing, such as summing surface area across 
individual items, and thus does not require individuating items in the array. As such, the 
number of items in the display – that is the number of items over which CA is tracked – 
is irrelevant to CA tracking and thus set size should have no impact on the precision of 
CA acuity. Support for this hypothesis comes from studies revealing similar infant CA 
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discrimination abilities for small sets (2-3 items) as that of large sets (10-15 items)4, 
suggesting that CA acuity is unaffected by set size (Cordes & Brannon, 2008). This 
Direct Perception Hypothesis underlies many neo-Piagetian claims (e.g. Gebuis & 
Reynvoet, 2012b; SoM: Leibovich et al., 2017; Mix, Huttenlocher, & Levine, 2002) 
positing the direct perception of continuous extent quantities, thus making them easier to 
track than abstract quantities, like number.  
On the other hand, we propose an alternative possibility, known as the 
‘Computation’ hypothesis (see also Barth, 2008). Rather than representing CA directly, 
according to the Computation hypothesis, we may track CA by representing the surface 
area of individual items within an array (likely through direct perception of the surface 
area of individual items) and then summing across these representations (e.g. adding 
representations of individual areas together). Because prior research suggests that mental 
summation is not a completely noiseless process (Cordes et al., 2007), each addition 
process contributes noise to the representation. Thus, precision in the representation of 
CA should decrease as the number of elements in the display increases. Unlike the Direct 
Perception hypothesis, under the Computation hypothesis CA acuity should be affected 
by the number of items in the display, with worse acuity as the set size increases. The 
Computation hypothesis is supported by prior research revealing infants are significantly 
better (i.e., more precise) at tracking the area of a single item, compared to tracking the 
CA of multiple items (Brannon, Abbot, & Lutz, 2004; Brannon, Lutz, & Cordes, 2006; 
																																																								
4 This study relied upon a standard habituation looking-time paradigm, revealing that 
infants were capable of discriminating a 4-fold, but not a 3-fold, change in CA, across 
exclusively small and exclusively large sets. Because infant habituation techniques do not 
lend themselves to fine-grained assessments of discrimination abilities, it is not possible 
to determine whether discrimination capabilities may have varied somewhat as a function 
of set-size between the 4-fold and 3-fold changes.  
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Cordes & Brannon, 2008). Additionally, Barth (2008) compared quantitative models of 
adult CA judgements and determined that a summation account provided the best 
explanation for the data.  
The Current Study 
Importantly, no studies have directly examined the effect of set size on 
cumulative area tracking abilities in adults. With supporting evidence for both the Direct 
Perception and Computation hypotheses, it is still unclear how we track CA and how 
these abilities may hinge upon numerical information in the display. One key distinction 
between the two hypotheses is in the role that number plays in CA discriminations. While 
the Direct Perception hypothesis assumes that number should have no effect of CA 
acuity, the Computation hypothesis predicts less CA acuity with increasing set size. In 
the current study, we presented adults with a CA discrimination task in which they 
judged which of two arrays of items had a greater CA. We manipulated 4 variables: the 
CA Ratio (the ratio between the CAs of two displays – a way of varying the relative 
difficulty of the comparison to provide a means of assessing CA acuity), Set Size (how 
many items were in each display), the Number Ratio (the ratio between the number of 
items in the two displays) and Congruency (whether the display with the larger number of 
dots had the smaller or greater CA). By manipulating these 4 variables, we explored the 
following questions:  
(1) Does numerical congruency matter for CA judgements? If (according to the 
SoM theory) CA is relatively more salient than number, then CA judgements should be 
unaffected by whether or not numerical information is consistent or inconsistent with CA 
magnitude. On the other hand, some prior work suggests that numerical information is 
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automatically processed, even in the context of a CA judgement task (Barth, 2008; 
Hurewitz et al., 2006), suggesting both quantities may be similarly salient. If so, then 
congruent numerical information should promote CA discrimination performance and/or 
incongruent numerical information should hinder CA discrimination performance. We 
aim to both explore whether numerical congruency has an impact and then, by comparing 
performance to a number neutral condition (in which both displays have an equal number 
of items), we will determine whether numerical congruency either facilitates and/or 
hinders CA judgements.  
(2) Do numerical differences across the displays impact our CA tracking 
abilities? That is, do participants perform worse on incongruent trials when the difference 
in number between the two arrays (i.e., the ratio between the number of dots in each 
array) is more salient than when it is less salient (i.e. the ratio between the two set sizes is 
closer to 1)? Conversely, might bigger numerical differences on congruent trials support 
CA judgements? To investigate this question, we presented 3 distinct Number Ratios (1, 
1.33 and 1.5) across trials to explore how numerical changes may matter for CA 
judgements.  
(3) How does set size impact CA acuity? To investigate whether larger sets 
produce less accurate CA representations (as predicted by the Computation hypothesis), 
we presented participants with arrays containing exclusively small (2-4 dots), medium (6-
9 dots), or large (9-15) sets. Furthermore, since evidence suggests infants can track the 
area of a single item with greater precision than the CA of multiple items (Brannon, Lutz, 
& Cordes, 2006; Cordes & Brannon, 2008), we also presented participants with single 
item size comparisons to assess whether a similar pattern is found later in development.  
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Across two experiments, we addressed these research questions by asking adult 
participants to rapidly judge which of two simultaneously presented visual arrays had the 
larger CA. Importantly, number was irrelevant to our task demands and thus should have 
had no influence on performance. In both experiments, we manipulated the numerical and 
CA ratio, set size and numerical congruency.  
Experiment 1  
Given that few studies have examined adult CA judgements, Experiment 1 
examined the effect of Set Size on adults’ CA discrimination performance. Participants 
completed a discrimination task in which they were asked to choose which of two arrays 
of blue dots had a greater CA. 
Methods 
Participants 
Seventy-eight Boston College students participated in our study in exchange for 
cash or course credit (66 female, M = 18.89 years, Range = 18-26 years). Informed 
consent was obtained from all participants.  
Procedure 
Each participant completed the study on a computer with a 22’’ monitor. 
Participants were first presented with an instruction screen that informed them that on 
each trial, they should choose the display of dots with the “greater amount of blue, 
therefore the greater cumulative area of blue.” Each trial consisted of two side-by-side 
displays of blue dots and participants made a forced choice judgement about the 
presented pair of displays by pressing the left or right arrow key on the keyboard. They 
were first presented with a minimum of four practice trials; only once they had responded 
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correctly on three of the four practice trials did they move onto the test trials (all 
participants moved to the test trials after the first set of four practice trials). The practice 
trials were designed to be very easy for the participant, with the CA Ratio changing 3-
fold across the two displays, and the number of items (set size) varying from 2-12 dots 
(this was identical in range to the test trials). Next, participants received 190 test trials, 
with a break every 50 trials (3 breaks total). Participants were encouraged to look away 
from the computer and talk to the experimenter during the break. The order of the trials, 
as well as which display was presented on the left or right side of the screen was 
randomized for each participant. 
Across trials we manipulated the following variables: CA Ratio (1.15, 1.33, 1.45, 
1.6, or 1.9), Number Ratio (1, 1.33 or 1.5), Congruency (Congruent, Incongruent), and 
Set Size (Small (2-4), Medium (6-9) or Large (9-15) sets) to determine how these factors 
influenced participants’ CA judgements. Participants experienced a total of 180 trials 
involving arrays of multiple items: 5 CA ratios x 3 Number Ratios x 2 Congruency x 3 
Set Sizes x 2 trials. In addition, intermixed amongst the multiple item trials were 10 
single item trials: 2 trials x 5 CA ratios (See Table 2.1 for breakdown of trials). 
Importantly, however, trials involving the Number Ratio 1 were neutral trials since they 
were neither congruent nor incongruent. Lastly, for each CA Ratio, we included two trials 
that were “single” trials in which each display contained only one dot. These trials would 
allow us to compare participants’ area discriminations involving a single item compared 
to CA discriminations involving multiple items (trials with small, medium  




Upon completing the test trials, participants were asked two questions. The first 
question was open-ended and asked participants to briefly describe the strategies they 
used to make their decisions in the task. We included this question as a general gauge of 
the approaches people took when comparing cumulative areas. The second question was 
multiple-choice and asked participants which of the following choices best described 
what cues they used to make their decision(s). Participants chose one from a list of five 
possible answers: (1) I squished all the dots together for each image and used that as a 
cue, (2) I used the number of dots in each image as a cue, (3) I used the density of dots in 
each image as a cue, (4) I estimated the average size of the dots on each image and used 
that as a cue, (5) I tried to find the smallest/biggest dot in each image and used that as a 
Number 
Ratio 
1, 1.33 or 1.5  
Single 
Trials Set Size Small Medium Large 
Congruency Cong.  Incong. Cong.  Incong. Cong.  Incong. 
Table 2.1. Experiment 1: Breakdown of the number of stimuli per variable manipulated.  
Participants were tested on 5 CA Ratios (1.15, 1.33, 1.45, 1.6, or 1.9). Then for each CA 
Ratio, trials were broken down as illustrated above for the variables of Number Ratio, 
Set Size and Congruency. This resulted in total of 180 multiple items trials (5 CA ratios 
x 3 Number Ratios x 2 Congruency x 3 Set Sizes x 2 trials = 180 trials). Additionally, 
participants were tested on 2 single trials per CA Ratio, for a total of 10 single trials. In 




cue. We included these options because we predicted that these would encompass the 
most commonly used strategies5.  
Stimuli 
Stimuli were created using Adobe Illustrator (See Figure 2.1 for stimuli). For our 
CA values, we generated a list of 12 random CA values between 20-45 cm2 (this range 
was deemed reasonable for our display size, ensuring that each individual dot would not 
become so small that they would be hard to see, or so big that they would not fit within 
the stimulus background) and used these 12 values for each Number and CA Ratio. These 
random numbers were then multiplied by the appropriate CA Ratio to determine the CA 
of the comparison display. Thus, across all CA Ratios tested, the CA values ranged 
between 23-83.6 cm2. 
To ensure that participants would not be able to use the size of individual dots as a 
cue for discrimination, the dots in each array were heterogeneous in size. The individual 
dot sizes were randomly chosen to fall within 35% of the average element area (as per 
Lidz, Pietroski, Halberda, & Hunter, 2011). We also controlled for item density (which 
we here defined as the number of items per given display size) so that the two arrays 
being compared had identical densities, although across trials densities did vary from 
.009 - .03 items/cm2. Thus, the item background ranged from 226.7 cm2 to 460cm2.  
																																																								
5 Participants’ responses on these two questions was not related to their actual 
performance on the task and therefore these questions have not been further analyzed in 




 Our primary dependent measure involved accuracy on the task. Participants 
whose performance fell 3 standard deviations above or below the mean for their overall 
percentage correct on the task were excluded from any analyses (N=1). We also 
calculated Weber fractions for each participant using only the data from the trials with 
sets greater than 1. Weber fractions (w) are defined as the smallest change between two 
quantities that can be reliably be detected. We estimated w using a psychophysical model 
using Gaussian random variables as has been done in previous research (Halberda & 
Feigenson, 2008b; Izard, Pica, Spelke, & Dehaene, 2008; Moyer & Bayer, 1976). In 
short, we inputted each participants’ accuracy on the four hardest CA Ratios (1.15, 1.3, 
Set Size and Congruency












Figure 2.1. Example stimuli pairs for the 1.6 CA Ratio.  
Stimuli are broken down by Number Ratio, Set Size, and Congruency. For each stimuli 
pair, the image on the left with the darker border has the larger CA. 
 
	45	
1.45 and 1.6) and manipulated a single free parameter w until we found a Weber curve 
that best fitted the data and that minimized error (Halberda & Feigenson, 2008b).  
Results & Discussion 
On average, participants performed well on our task with 85.76% accuracy 
(Range = 60.53-98.42%). The average Weber fraction across all trials with multiple items 
was w = .23, (Range = .07-1.2; SD = .16, SE = .018). We compared this Weber fraction 
to the Weber fraction previously reported by Odic et al. (2013) with adults on a number 
discrimination task (w = .13, SE = .02, SD = .057, N = 8). Since the two samples varied 
so widely in their standard deviations and the number of participants tested, we 
conducted an independent samples t-test assuming unequal variances using the Welch-
Satterthwaite procedure for unequal variances. This revealed that the weber fraction for 
our CA discrimination task was significantly higher than that reported for the numerical 
discriminations, t(16.22) = 3.35, p < .01, suggesting that CA acuity in our study was 
significantly worse than prior reports of numerical acuity (a higher weber fraction 
indicates lower acuity).  
Does numerical congruency matter for CA judgements?  
To explore our first research question, we specifically examined accuracy on 
those trials involving arrays with more than one item (excluding single item trials) in 
which the number of items differed across arrays (i.e., where numerical ratio did not 
equal one). We ran a 5 (CA Ratio: 1.15, 1.3, 1.45, 1.6, 1.9) x 2 (Number Ratio:1.33 or 
1.5) x 2 (Congruency: Congruent vs. Incongruent) repeated measures ANOVA on data 
from those trials. Not surprisingly, results revealed a main effect of CA ratio (F(4, 304) = 
192.92, p < .001, ηp2 = .72) such that performance improved as CA ratio got larger. A 
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paired samples t-test between all 5 levels revealed that performance on all CA ratios was 
significantly different from one another (p’s < .001). Analyses also revealed a main effect 
of congruency (F(1,76) = 19.06, p < .001, ηp2 = .54), such that participants performed 
significantly better on congruent (M = 93.55%) compared to incongruent trials (M = 
71.30%), in line with previous research (Barth, 2008; Hurewitz et al., 2006) and in 
contradiction of predictions of the SoM Theory. Results also revealed a significant CA 
ratio x Congruency interaction (See Figure 2.2), F(4,304) = 28.40, p < .001, ηp2 = .27. 
Paired samples t-tests revealed that regardless of CA ratio, participants performed 
significantly better on the congruent compared to incongruent trials (p’s < .001); 
however, this difference became smaller as the CA ratio became easier (i.e., further from 
1). That is, not surprisingly, numerical congruency had a greater impact on more difficult 
Figure 2.2. Experiment 1: Percent Correct as a function of CA Ratio (1.15, 1.3, 1.45, 
1.6 and 1.9) and Congruency (Congruent and Incongruent).  
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CA discriminations. Lastly, analyses revealed a main effect of Number Ratio (F(1,76) = 
20.68, p < .001, ηp2 = .21) which was qualified by a significant Number Ratio x 
Congruency interaction (F(1,76) = 16.03, p < .001, ηp2 = .17). Although adults performed 
better on congruent compared to incongruent trials for both numerical ratios (1.33 ratio: 
t(76) = 8.26, p < .001, d = 1.40; 1.5 ratio: t(76) = 9.73, p < .001, d = 1.67), the impact of 
congruency was greater when the numerical ratio between the two arrays was greater 
(that is, number mattered more when the numerical difference was more salient; 1.33 
numerical ratio: Mdifference = 19.61%, t(76) = 4.00, p < .001, d = .24; 1.5 numerical ratio: 
Mdifference = 24.89%; t(76) = 4.00, p < .001, d = .24;  see Figure 2.3). Furthermore, 
although there was no difference in performance between the two Number Ratios for 
congruent trials (Mdifference = 0.52%; t(76) = .81, p = .41, d = .13) there was for 
Figure 2.3. Experiment 1: Percent Correct as a function of Number Ratio (1.33 and 
1.5) and Congruency (Congruent and Incongruent).  
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incongruent trials (Mdifference = 5.80%, t(76) = 4.85, p < .001, d = .32).  
Do numerical differences across the displays impact our CA tracking abilities? 
Next, we examined the impact of numerical congruency. That is, relative to 
neutral trials (trials where the number of items was the same in both displays i.e., Number 
Ratio 1) did numerical congruency promote performance, did numerical incongruency 
detrimentally impact performance, or both? We performed a repeated measures ANOVA 
comparing performance across all three types of trials (neutral, congruent, incongruent; 
collapsing across all numerical and CA ratios). The main effect of congruency was 
significant, F(2, 152) = 90.86, p < .001, η2 = .55. Paired samples t-tests revealed that 





















Figure 2.4. Experiment 1: Percent Correct as a function of Number Ratio (1.33 and 
1.5) and Congruency (Congruent and Incongruent). Error bars represent standard 
error. 
	49	
neutral trials (90.91%, t(76) = 10.93, p < .001, d = 1.36) and that performance on the 
congruent trials (93.55%) was significantly better than the neutral trials (t(76) = 2.80, p < 
.01, d = .053, See Figure 2.4). Thus, conflicting numerical information (i.e., 
incongruency) detrimentally impacted performance relative to neutral trials, but 
consistent numerical information (i.e. congruency) also facilitated performance relative to 
neutral trials. Although incongruent numerical information appeared to detrimentally 
impact performance significantly more so than congruent numerical information 
benefited performance, it should be noted that the high level of performance on congruent 
trials may have led to ceiling effects in performance, limiting the extent to which 
performance could benefit from congruent numerical information. 
How does set size impact CA acuity?  
To investigate how differing set sizes impacted CA discrimination performance, 
we ran a repeated measures ANOVA comparing performance across the four set sizes 
(single item, small set, medium set, large set). Importantly because single item trials 
necessarily were number neutral (i.e., a comparison of one item to one item cannot 
involve congruent or incongruent trials), we limited this analysis to only number neutral 
trials (those trials where number was identical in both arrays i.e., Number Ratio 1). 
Analyses revealed a significant effect of set size (F(3,228) = 8.05, p < .001, η2 = .10), 
driven by significantly better performance on the Single trials (M = 94.36) compared to 
Small (M = 91.22), Medium (M = 90.26), or Large sets (M = 89.81, p’s < .01, d’s > .95). 
Although performance tended to decrease as a function of increasing set size, the 
difference in performance across Small, Medium, and Large set sizes did not reach 
significance (p’s > .15; See Figure 2.5).  
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Because it is conceivable that the processes involved in tracking area in our single 
item trials may have been distinct from those involving more than one item (i.e., direct 
perception of area of a single item versus a potential computation process for tracking CA 
of a group of objects), we performed one additional analysis to explicitly compare 
performance as a function of set size for only those trials involving arrays of items. We 
calculated the slope relating performance to small, medium, and large set sizes (dummy 
coding small as 1, medium as 2, and large as 3), examining only performance on the 


















Figure 2.5. Experiment 1: Percent Correct as a function of Set Size (Single, Small, 
Medium and Large). Error bars represent standard error.  
* p< .05, ** p< .01, *** p<.001 
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differ significantly from 0, t(77)=1.38, p=.17, d = -.156. This suggests that although 
performance decreased as set size increased, this trend was not significant.  
Altogether, results from Experiment 1 suggest that CA discriminations in adults 
are ratio-dependent, hindered and possibly facilitated by numerical congruency, but less 
impacted by set size. Furthermore, we found that although adults are significantly better 
at discriminating the size of a single item compared to discriminating CA across multiple 
items, the size of the actual set (e.g. whether there were 2-3 items or 7-8 items) did not 
have an effect on CA performance, consistent with the Direct Perception Hypothesis.  
Experiment 2 
The goal of Experiment 2 was the replicate findings of Experiment 1 with some 
small changes. Firstly, in Experiment 1, we controlled for item density by holding 
constant the number of items in the display per unit background area. Although this 
controlled for density of the items within the display, it did not allow us to rule out that 
participants relied upon the relative amount of white background within the display. In 
Experiment 2, we controlled for area density by holding constant the relevant surface 
area (to be tracked) per unit background to ensure that density did not drive our pattern of 
results. Moreover, in Experiment 2, we eliminated the 1.9 CA Ratio since adults 
performed at ceiling on this ratio, thus Experiment 2 tested adults on only 4 CA Ratios: 
1.15, 1.3, 1.45 and 1.6. 
																																																								
6 Even when we excluded the easiest 1.9 ratio where participants were performing at 
ceiling, we found a negative slope of -.005 that did not differ significantly from 0, t(76) = 
.87, p = .39, d = -.10. 
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Methods 
The methods of Experiment 2 were identical to Experiment 1 except for the 
following: 
Participants 
A total of 54 undergraduate students from Boston College participated in our 
study in exchange for cash or course credit (41 female, M = 19.65 years, Range = 18-26 
years). Since the effect sizes we obtained in Experiment 1 were larger than expected, we 
reduced our sample size in this Experiment. All participants provided informed consent. 
Procedure 
Experiment 2 included the following variables and their levels: CA Ratio (1.15, 
1.33, 1.45, 1.6), Number Ratio (1, 1.33 or 1.5), Congruency (Congruent, Incongruent), 
and Set Size (Small, Medium, Large). Similar to Experiment 1, we continued to have 38 
trials per CA Ratio (this includes 2 single item trials per CA Ratio), leading to a total of 
152 unique trials. To increase the precision in our measurement, we presented 
participants with the 152 unique trials 3 times over the course of the experiment (yielding 
456 trials total). The trials were organized in blocks such that a participant was presented 
with all 152 unique trials before the trials would be repeated, with an unlimited break 
every 100 trials (5 breaks total). Otherwise, procedures were identical to Experiment 1.  
Stimuli 
The only changes made to the stimuli was that we now controlled for density by 
dividing the CA by the size of the display. The density was identical across the two 
arrays to be compared in each trial, although across trials densities did vary from .08-.15 
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(CA/background area in cm2). Thus, the area of our background ranged from 193.3 – 300 
cm2.  
Results & Discussion 
Consistent with the fact that we dropped the easiest CA ratio in this experiment, 
performance was significantly less accurate here compared to Experiment 1 (t(116) = 
2.19, p = .03, d = .40), with an average of 80.19% correct (Range = 50.00-96.05%). Since 
we suspected that this was due to the exclusion of the easiest 1.9 CA Ratio, we performed 
a second independent samples t-test this time comparing performance on Experiment 1 
and 2 excluding the easiest 1.9 CA Ratio in Experiment 1 as well (M = 83.47%, Range = 
58.55-98.02%) and the difference in performance was no longer statistically significant 
(t(116) = 1.03, p = .31, d = .19), suggesting that lower performance in this Experiment 
was due to the fact that we eliminated our easiest CA Ratio.  
The average weber fraction across participants was w = .32, (Range = .09-2.1, SD 
=.36, SE=.05), this was marginally worse than in Experiment 1, (t(127) = 1.90, p = .06, d 
= .32). We again using the Welch-Satterthwaite procedure for unequal variances to 
compare our weber fraction to that which has been previously reported by Odic et al. 
(2013) and found a significant difference in performance, t(54.96) = 3.43, p < .01, 
suggesting that CA acuity in our study was significantly worse than prior reports of 
numerical acuity. 
Does numerical congruency matter for CA judgements?  
As in Experiment 1, we examined accuracy on trials involving arrays of multiple 
items in which number was either congruent or incongruent. A 4 (CA Ratio: 1.15, 1.3, 
1.45, 1.6) x 2 (Number Ratio: 1.33 or 1.5) x 2 (Congruency: Congruent vs. Incongruent) 
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repeated measures ANOVA again revealed a main effect of CA ratio, F(3, 159) = 167.88, 
p < .001, ηp2 = .76. Performance on all 4 CA ratios was significantly different from one 
another (p’s<.001), with performance improving as the CA Ratio increased, replicating 
our previous finding that cumulative area discriminations adhere to Weber’s Law. In 
contradiction of predictions of the SoM Theory, we found a significant main effect of 
Congruency, (F(1,53) = 60.62, p<.001, ηp2 = .53) such that participants performed 
significantly better on congruent (M = 91.70%) compared to incongruent (M = 62.90%) 
trials. We also again found a CA ratio x Congruency interaction, F(3,159) = 24.89, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .32. Paired samples t-tests revealed that regardless of CA ratio, participants 
performed significantly better on the congruent compared to the incongruent trials; 
Figure 2.6. Experiment 2 Percent Correct as a function of CA Ratio (1.15, 1.3, 1.45, 
1.6 and 1.9) and Congruency (Congruent and Incongruent).  
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however, again the impact of congruency lessened as the CA ratio increased (i.e., became 
easier; p’s < .001; See Figure 2.6).  
Lastly, we replicated our main effect of Number Ratio (F(1,53)=14.19, p<.001, 
ηp2	= .21) with participants performing better on the 1.33 Ratio (M = 78.49%) compared 
to the 1.5 Ratio (M = 76.12%; See Figure 2.7). However, unlike Experiment 1, we did not 
find a Number Ratio x Congruency interaction, F(1,53) = 2.33, p = .13, ηp2	= .04 
(although the pattern of results was identical across experiments). 
 
Do numerical differences across the displays impact our CA tracking abilities?  
As in Experiment 1, we examined to what extent congruency or incongruency 
between number and CA was helping or hurting performance in this task. Therefore, we 
Figure 2.7. Experiment 2: Percent Correct as a function of the Number Ratio (1.33 
and 1.5) and Congruency (Congruent and Incongruent). 
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ran a repeated measures ANOVA comparing performance on the number-neutral trials 
(trials of the Number Ratio 1) with performance of congruent trials and incongruent trials 
(again, collapsing all analyses across the 1.33 and 1.5 Number Ratio and across all CA 
ratios). Once again the ANOVA was significant, F(2, 106) = 61.29, p < .001, ηp2 = .54. 
Paired samples t-tests revealed that performance on congruent trials (91.72%) was 
significantly better than the neutral trials (84.28%, t(53) = 4.82, p < .001, d = 1.49), 
performance on the incongruent trials (62.90%) was significantly worse than the neutral 
trials (84.28%, t(53) = 8.85, p<.001, d = 1.07). Once again, this suggests that competing 
numerical information interferes with CA judgements, and consistent numerical 





















Figure 2.8. Experiment 1: Percent Correct as a function of Congruency 
(Congruent, Neutral and Congruent). Error bars represent standard error.  
p < .10, * p< .05, ** p< .01, *** p<.001 
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How does set size impact CA acuity? 
To examine the effect of set size on CA discriminations, we again looked at those 
trials where number was held constant within trials, but differed across trials. That is, we 
compared performance on Single trials to Small, Medium and Large trials involving the 1 
Number Ratio. A within-subjects ANOVA again revealed a significant effect of set size 
(F(3,159) = 20.55, p < .001, ηp2 = .28), and follow-up paired samples t-tests revealed this 
was once again driven by the Single trials (M = 90.35%) where participants performed 
significantly better than Small (M = 86.84%), Medium (M = 82.94%) or Large trials (M = 
83.06%; p’s < .001). In contrast to Experiment 1, however, we found participants 
performed significantly better on Small compared to Medium and Large trials (p’s < 
.001; See Figure 2.9) 
Next, to specifically address the impact of set size on performance on trials 
involving sets, we calculated the slope for performance on small, medium, and large set 
sizes. Here we examined only performance on the neutral trials, with a Number Ratio 1, 
and found a negative slope (slope = -.019) that differed significantly from 0 (t(53) = 3.54, 
p < .001, d = -.48). This suggests that there was a steady decrease in performance as set 
size increased. 
Results from Experiment 2 replicate our findings in Experiment 1. Not only did 
we replicate previous findings revealing that CA discriminations abide by Weber’s law, 
congruency between number and CA plays an important role in discrimination 
performance. Once again, our results suggest that number is more likely to interfere with 
CA judgements than to assist them. Moreover, Set Size mattered in that adults were 
significantly better at discriminating the size of single items compared to the CA of 
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multiple items, and the size of the actual set (e.g. whether there were 2-3 items or 7-8 
items) did have some (although not a robust) effect on CA performance.  
 
Combined Analysis 
We combined data from Experiment 1 and 2 and compared the average weber 
fraction across participants across Experiments, which was w = .27, (Range = .07-2.1), to 
weber fractions previous reported by Odic et al. (2013) for adult numerical discrimination 
tasks (using the Welch-Satterthwaite procedure for unequal variances) and once again 
found a significant difference in performance, t(23.17) = 4.09, p < .001, with participants 




















Figure 2.9. Experiment 2: Percent Correct as a function of Set Size (Single, Small, 
Medium and Large). Error bars represent standard error. 
* p< .05, ** p< .01, *** p<.001 
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Given that our results regarding the effect of set size on performance were 
inconclusive (we found a significant effect of set size in Experiment 2 but not 1), we 
combined our data from Experiments 1 and 2 to run another slope analysis (excluding 
data from the 1.9 ratio in Experiment 1), again looking only at the neutral trials with 
Number Ratio 1. We found a negative slope of -.011, which was significantly different 
from 0, t(130) = 2.59, p = .011, d = -.21 suggesting that overall, participants did show 
increasingly worse performance as set size increased.  
General Discussion 
The aim of this study was to investigate if and how CA discriminations are 
influenced by numerical information in adults. Although many previous studies have 
investigated adult abilities to discriminate discrete quantity (i.e. number discrimination; 
Halberda & Feigenson, 2008c; Odic et al., 2013), very few studies have examined adults’ 
performance on discrimination tasks that involve continuous properties, such as CA. This 
is a particularly interesting question given the claims made by proponents of the SoM that 
continuous quantities should be more easily represented than number because unlike 
number which is abstract, continuous quantities are perceptual in nature and are not tied 
to any specific sensory modality (Gebuis & Reynvoet, 2012b; Leibovich et al., 2017). As 
a direct test of these claims, many studies have investigated whether we can track number 
independent of continuous properties, finding that even human infants can do so 
(Halberda & Feigenson, 2008b; Lipton & Spelke, 2003; Odic et al., 2013; Starr et al., 
2013a; Xu & Spelke, 2000; Xu et al., 2005). However, less work has explored the 
converse; that is, how well can we track continuous properties independent of number?  
	60	
Our first aim was to examine whether congruency between number and area 
played a role in adults’ discrimination performance. If CA is significantly more salient 
and easy to represent than number, then CA acuity should be more precise than that of 
number. This did not appear to be the case. In addition to replicating previous findings 
suggesting that CA discriminations were ratio-dependent (Halberda & Feigenson, 2008a; 
Odic et al., 2013), we also found that the average weber fraction associated with CA 
discriminations was not significantly lower than those previously reported for number 
discrimination (Odic et al., 2013), contradicting any claims that adults are better at 
discriminating continuous quantities compared to number (Leibovich & Henik, 2014). 
Moreover, if CA is more salient and easy to represent than number, then numerical 
information should be less likely to interfere with CA representations than vice versa. 
Again, this did not appear to be the case. Across two experiments, we found that 
participants overwhelmingly performed better on congruent trials (e.g. when the arrays 
with the larger number of dots also have a greater CA) compared to incongruent trials 
(e.g. when the larger number array has a smaller CA), replicating previous findings 
(Barth, 2008; DeWind & Brannon, 2012; Gebuis & Reynvoet, 2012a; Hurewitz, Gelman, 
& Schnitzer, 2006). Not surprisingly, numerical information had a greater impact on 
adult performance for the most difficult CA judgements. That is, we found that numerical 
congruency had a larger effect for harder CA discriminations and for trials where the 
ratio in number between the two arrays was larger.  
Moreover, our study expanded upon previous research by exploring whether 
numerical congruency facilitated CA judgements, whether numerical incongruency 
hindered CA judgements, or both, specifically when compared to neutral trials where the 
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number of items in both arrays is identical (i.e. trials where the ratio of number was 1). 
We found both to be the case: incongruency between Number and CA significantly hurt 
performance and congruency between these two variables boosted performance, 
suggesting that adults can and will use all available quantity information in making 
quantitative judgements, whether or not this information is helpful or hurtful.  
The final, and most important goal of this study was to understand the process by 
which adults represent CA when presented with an array of items. In particular, we 
compared two possible hypotheses. On the one hand, the ‘Direct Perception’ hypothesis 
assumed that we extract how much surface area we see in the display without any 
reliance upon individuating the items in the array, which is consistent with SoM theory 
(Gebuis & Reynvoet, 2012b; SoM: Leibovich et al., 2017; Mix, Huttenlocher, & Levine, 
2002). On the other hand, the ‘Computation’ hypothesis proposed that adults track the 
sizes of each individual item within the array and perform a summation process to arrive 
at an estimate of the CA of the array (as proposed by Barth, 2008). To distinguish 
between these two accounts, we investigated how set size affected performance on this 
task. Assuming that this summation process contributes error to the representation 
(Cordes et al., 2007), the ‘Computation’ hypothesis would predict a decrease in 
performance as the number of items in the array increased since each additional item adds 
to the error in the summation or computation process. The ‘Direct Perception’ hypothesis 
would not predict a relationship between CA acuity and set size. Indeed, we found that 
adults performed significantly more accurately on trials where they were presented with 
single items (trials that required them to make element area comparisons) compared to 
trials with small (2-4 dots), medium (6-9 dots), or large (9-15) sets. Furthermore, 
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although analyses were mixed across experiments, slope analyses combining data from 
Experiments 1 and 2 demonstrated that as set size increased, accuracy in making CA 
judgements decreased. This provides support for the Computation Hypothesis, suggesting 
that when making CA judgements, adults represent the surface area of individual items 
within an array and sum across these representations to gain a representation of the 
array’s CA. These findings are in line with previous findings by Barth (2008), whose 
computational model suggested that a computational account of CA representation 
provided the best explanation for the data.  
Furthermore, our finding that adults find it easier to discriminate single items 
compared to sets of items suggests that distinct processes may be at play when tracking 
the area of an individual item versus tracking the area of an array. In the former case, 
other continuous quantities – such as the diameter of the item – may serve as a reasonable 
cue for discrimination and thus area may not even be tracked under these circumstances. 
In the case of an array of items, though, it is unlikely that successful discrimination can 
take place without tracking the area of the items within the array. Moreover, the fact that 
differences in acuity persist in judging the area of a single item versus an array of items 
emphasizes that if we do want to make comparisons between adult abilities to represent 
discrete and continuous properties, or make claims about the saliency of continuous 
variables in the context of numerical stimuli, it is important that we test both in the same 
context – that is, within arrays of objects. Given that tests of numerical discrimination by 
definition require adults to make estimates or computations across multiple items, one 
should similarly examine the representation of continuous dimensions in the context of 
sets. In fact, evidence with infants supports this: Brannon et al. (2006) found that while 7 
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month olds infants were to discriminate a 1:2 ratio in EA of a single item, when presented 
with arrays of items this same age group needed as much as a 1:4 change to detect a 
difference in the EA (Cordes & Brannon, 2011). Although infants were asked to do the 
same exact type of task, the mere presence of multiple items detracted from infant’s 
abilities to represent EA.  
In conclusion, our results are in stark contrast with claims of a SoM theory. In 
particular, our results suggest that CA discriminations – in the context of multiple items – 
are not more precise than that of numerical discriminations, and may in fact be even 
marginally less precise. Moreover, though it was completely irrelevant to the task 
demands and thus not a reliable cue for tracking, we find that number is automatically 
processed in the context of CA judgements suggesting that number is at least as salient as 
this continuous quantity. Importantly, by examining the effect of set size on these 
discriminations, we found support for the Computation hypothesis, suggesting that adults 
represent CA by summing across individual items with an array. Future work will be 
needed to determine whether the computation mechanisms that adults are engaging in 
when making these discriminations are present early on in development or whether they 
are learned over time. That is, it would be interesting to investigate whether infants and 




CHAPTER 3: RELATIVE SALIENCE OF NUMBER: PRESCHOOLER’S 
NUMBER KNOWLEDGE RELATES TO SPONTANEOUS FOCUSING ON 
NUMBER FOR SMALL, BUT NOT LARGE, SETS 
Abstract 
Much research has examined the reciprocal relationship between a child’s 
spontaneous focus on number (SFON) in the preschool years and later mathematical 
achievement. However, many different tasks have been used in the literature to assess 
SFON that have distinct task demands (verbal vs. behavioral) and stimuli (different types 
and quantities of other features available to the child to focus on outside of number) and 
it is unclear to what extent these tasks are measuring the same underlying construct. 
Moreover, prior studies have investigated SFON in the context of small sets exclusively, 
but no work has explored whether individual differences exist in SFON for large sets and 
whether these differences relate to math ability. In the current study, preschoolers were 
presented four distinct SFON tasks assessing their spontaneous attention to number for 
small (Experiment 1) and large (Experiment 2) sets of number. Results revealed no 
relation in SFON performance across the four distinct SFON tasks. Moreover, in contrast 
to predictions of a single construct of SFON, preschooler’s SFON for small sets (1-4 
items) was significantly stronger than that for large sets (10-40 items) and analyses 
revealed that number knowledge was only associated with SFON for small sets, but not 
large. Together, findings suggest that SFON may not be a set-size independent construct, 
and instead may hinge upon a child’s number knowledge, at least in the preschool years. 
The role of number language and how it relates to children’s SFON are discussed.  
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Relative Salience of Number: Preschooler’s Number Knowledge Relates to Spontaneous 
Focusing on Number for Small, but not Large, Sets 
There are documented individual differences in children’s tendencies to pay 
attention to number in their natural environment, with some children naturally attending 
to number in their day-to-day lives more than others (Hannula-Sormunen & Lehtinen, 
2005; Hannula et al., 2007). A child’s propensity to focus on number without any 
prompting has been called Spontaneous Focusing on Number (SFON; Hannula & 
Lehtinen, 2005). Much research has examined the reciprocal relationship between SFON 
and math skills; finding not only that individual differences in SFON in the preschool 
years predict later long-term measures of math achievement (Hannula-Sormunen, 
Lehtinen, & Räsänen, 2015; Hannula-Sormunen, Lepola, & Lehtinen, 2010; McMullen, 
Hannula-Sormunen, & Lehtinen, 2015), but also that early number skills acquired in the 
preschool years (such as counting abilities) relate to SFON a few years later (Hannula-
Sormunen & Lehtinen, 2005).  
However, the limits of SFON are still unclear. That is, is SFON a general attribute 
pertaining to attention to any numerical information in the environment, or might it be set 
size- or task- specific? In the current study, we investigated two different research 
questions: (1) How does children’s SFON differ as a function of the task used to assess 
it? Multiple tasks have been used to assess SFON, some that are verbally-based and 
others that are purely behavioral (i.e. not reliant upon language), yet little is known about 
how SFON may differ as a function of these tasks. There is some evidence to suggest that 
a child’s SFON may vary substantially across distinct SFON tasks (Batchelor, Inglis, & 
Gilmore, 2015), however this study did not explore all SFON tasks in the literature, 
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choosing instead to focus on the two most prominent SFON tasks. A systematic 
comparison in performance on different SFON measures can therefore help elucidate 
how task demands may affect a child’s likelihood of focusing on number spontaneously. 
We also asked: (2) How does set size affect preschooler’s SFON? To date, investigations 
of SFON in preschoolers have mostly been limited to small (<5 items) sets of items 
which young children are more likely to be able to enumerate and count compared to 
larger sets. Do children spontaneously attend to number even when they may be unable to 
accurately track the exact number of items present? Or might evidence of SFON be 
dependent upon their enumeration abilities? Getting an answer to these questions is 
important in furthering our understanding of the construct of SFON and the nature of its 
relationship with other numerical abilities.  
Spontaneous Focus on Number 
In the literature, an important distinction is made between knowing specific 
numerical skills (e.g., how to count), and knowing that these skills are relevant to the task 
at hand (e.g., that counting might be a relevant strategy for a particular task; Hannula-
Sormunen & Lehtinen, 2005). Although the majority of research in this domain tends to 
focus on the former (what mathematical knowledge do children possess and how can we 
teach it to them?), recent studies have also begun to focus on the latter (when do children 
realize that number might be an important dimension to focus on and/or relevant to the 
task?). SFON has been described as an attentional process that precedes (and is distinct 
from) enumeration (i.e., counting, identifying cardinality) with the idea being that SFON 
may predispose children to realize that they should individuate and enumerate objects 
(Hannula-Sormunen & Lehtinen, 2005). These ideas are supported by research revealing 
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that SFON around ages 3-4 predicts children’s enumeration and counting skills at ages 5-
6 (Hannula-Sormunen & Lehtinen, 2005; Hannula et al., 2007) and rational number 
knowledge at age 12 (McMullen et al., 2015). Moreover, SFON at age 6 is positively 
correlated with arithmetic skills but not reading skills two years later, suggesting that 
SFON is truly domain-specific (Hannula-Sormunen et al., 2010) and not simply a proxy 
for domain-general capacities such as IQ or working memory.  
One limitation of this research, however, is that SFON has only been tested with 
small sets (<5 items). In theory, SFON should pertain to attention to all numerical 
information, and should not be dependent upon an ability to enumerate the number of 
items, but instead reflect the recognition that number is a relevant dimension to attend. 
Since tests of SFON in preschoolers have only involved sets that they are also able to 
enumerate (i.e., count and identify the cardinality), it is unclear whether the ability to 
enumerate is a component of, or a necessary precursor to, demonstrating SFON for this 
age group. If SFON is truly a generalized attention to number, then it should not depend 
on the size of the sets involved nor on the child’s ability to enumerate the sets. That is, 
children should demonstrate similar levels of SFON for large sets as they do for small 
sets.  
The distinction between testing children on small and large sets is particularly 
important given what we know about children’s developing number knowledge. Even 
before children master the count procedure – that is, before they acquire a full 
understanding of cardinality and the meaning of all number words – they can have an 
understanding of the meaning of some of the number words (Le Corre & Carey, 2007). 
The process of learning to count is a lengthy process that progresses through a series of 
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stages over a period of 1-2 years. Research suggests that between the ages of 2.5 – 4, 
children start off as “subset knowers,” meaning that they have an understanding of the 
meaning of a subset of numbers but have yet to grasp the cardinal principle more 
generally (i.e., that the last number word used in a count list is the cardinality of the set). 
Subset knowers go through a step-wise process where they learn the meaning of the 
number word “one”, then “two” and so on. Not until after children learn the meaning of 
“four” do children acquire the cardinal principle – that the last number word used in a 
count refers to the cardinality of the set – and begin to understand the purpose of counting 
(thus becoming “cardinal-principle knowers” or CP-knowers; Wynn, 1992). At this point, 
it is expected that they now understand the meaning of all number words within their 
count list. This distinction between subset knowers and cardinal principle knowers is an 
important one because it represents qualitative differences in children’s behavior. For 
example, cardinal principle knowers more consistently recognize that counting is an 
effective strategy, whereas subset-knowers are less likely to spontaneously count in the 
face of a numerical task (Gordon, Chernyak, & Cordes, submitted; Le Corre & Carey, 
2007; Posid & Cordes, 2018; Wynn, 1992).  
Given that subset-knowers are able to accurately identify the cardinality of a small 
set, but not a large one, it is important to determine how this cardinal understanding may 
impact the likelihood of the child demonstrating SFON. That is, do subset-knowers 
demonstrate SFON at similar levels for small and large sets? Do we see differences 
between subset-knowers and CP-knowers? If, as Hannula-Sormunen and collegues 
(2010) claim, SFON is truly a domain-specific attentional phenomenon that is distinct 
from children’s actual numerical abilities, one would not only expect similar levels of 
	69	
SFON for small and large sets, but (similar to previous findings) one would expect SFON 
for both small and large sets to correlate with number knowledge. To our knowledge only 
one study has tested SFON with both small and large sets. Cantlon et al. (2010) tested 
children on a match-to-sample task where children could either match stimuli using 
number or cumulative surface area, presenting them with sets ranging from 1-12, and 
they found that regardless of set size, children chose the number match over the 
cumulative surface area match at above chance levels. Although they found that children 
performed better on any comparison that involved set size one, because their trials had 
small and large sets intermixed, they were not able to address whether the degree of 
SFON differed as a function of set size. Furthermore, since they did not test children’s 
number knowledge, they were not able to address whether their SFON differed as 
function of the child’s number knowledge (i.e., subset- versus CP-knower). 
Current Measures of SFON 
A secondary research question concerned reconciling different measures of SFON 
that have been used in prior literature. Three types of tasks have traditionally been used to 
measure SFON: A) Imitation tasks, B) Picture tasks, and C) Choice tasks. Although all 
three have been used across studies, it is unknown whether these tasks assess the same 
underlying SFON construct.  
In Imitation tasks, children as young as 3 years are shown a series of repetitive 
actions by an experimenter and are asked to imitate the experimenter (Hannula-Sormunen 
& Lehtinen, 2005; Hannula-Sormunen et al., 2015, 2007). For example, Hannula and 
Lehtinen (2005) showed participants a mailbox and letters of two different colors. The 
experimenter would put a certain number of letters of each color in the mailbox and the 
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child was asked to “do exactly like I just did” without any mention of number. The 
dependent variable in this task is whether or not the child imitates the number of actions 
the experimenter undertook, or alternatively whether they use number words while doing 
their imitation. Thus, this task relies very little upon a child’s linguistic capacities and 
instead requires a purely nonverbal behavioral response.  
Picture tasks are newer in the literature (Batchelor et al., 2015) and have typically 
been used with slightly older children (4-6 year olds) compared to the Imitation task. In 
the Picture task, children are presented with a picture containing a complex scene 
including sets of items and are asked to describe what they see in the picture. As in other 
SFON tasks, the child is not told about the nature of the task or what the experimenter is 
looking for in their description. In this case, the dependent variable is whether or not the 
child uses any number or quantity words in their descriptions. Importantly, both of these 
tasks hinge upon the ability to track exact number either verbally or behaviorally. Thus, 
any measure of SFON obtained from these measures necessarily correlates with an ability 
to encode exact number, something thought to be dependent upon number word learning.  
Choice tasks have more recently been designed as another way to measure SFON 
(Cantlon, Safford, & Brannon, 2010; Chan & Mazzocco, 2017). The Choice task involves 
an ambiguous match-to-sample game where children are asked to select the picture that 
“best matches” a sample picture (typically involving an array of items). On critical trials, 
one of the choice pictures matches the sample picture on the dimension of number, while 
the other matches the sample on another quantitative dimension such as Cumulative Area 
(CA; Cantlon, Safford, & Brannon, 2010), color, or shape (Chan & Mazzocco, 2017). By 
directly pitting number against other dimensions, these critical trials provide a measure of 
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children’s SFON, by measuring their relative preference for number over this other 
dimension. Cantlon et al. (2010) found that 3-5 year old children spontaneously focused 
on number over CA at a rate higher than chance alone, a finding that has been replicated 
with English and Japanese populations (see also Cantrell, Kuwabara, & Smith, 2015). 
Chan and Mazzocco (2017) found that the degree to which children matched based upon 
number depended on which other dimension number was pitted against. For example, 4-5 
year olds were much more likely to pick the number match when the other available 
choices involved relatively low-salience features (e.g., pattern and orientation) compared 
to highly salient features (e.g., color and shape).  
There are some important differences between these three SFON tasks that call 
into question whether they measure the same underlying construct. Although the Picture 
task relies upon a verbal response, both the Imitation and Choice tasks are behavioral 
measures of SFON. The verbal requirements of the Picture task may prevent some 
children with limited communication abilities from being able to demonstrate an attention 
to number and even furthermore it may require a level of comfort with number words that 
children in the preschool years (when this task has been used) simply do not have. This 
may explain why previous research has found that although performance on both the 
Picture and Imitation tasks predict arithmetic skills years later (Picture Task: Batchelor et 
al., 2015; Imitation Task: Hannula-Sormunen et al., 2010), performance on the two tasks 
do not correlate with one another (Batchelor et al., 2015; Rathé, Torbeyns, Hannula-
Sormunen, & Verschaffel, 2016). This suggests that these tasks may tap into distinct 
aspects of SFON (verbal vs. behavioral) or alternatively, the verbal demands of the 
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picture task may mask individual differences in underlying attention to number that 
children are unable to fully express verbally. 
 Furthermore, all three tasks vary in terms of the quantity and type of other 
features (outside of number) available to the child. While the Choice task presents 
children with a limited number of other dimensions to attend to over number (in that it 
pits one or two dimensions against number while controlling for other features), the 
Picture and Imitation tasks place few, if any, limits on the dimensions that a child may 
deem relevant for responding. For example, in the Imitation task, children could attend to 
the color or orientation of the cards placed in the mailbox, the facial expressions of the 
experimenter, or many other possible features. In the Picture task, anything in the picture 
is fair game. The Choice task, on the other hand, was specifically designed to measure the 
relative salience of number when pitted against only one or two other dimensions (e.g., 
number pitted against cumulative area or ratio), and as such it is allows for a more 
systematic interpretation of SFON. Therefore, in addition to systematically measuring 
SFON, it allows researchers to measure just how salient number is when compared to 
other quantities such as cumulative area (Cantlon et al., 2010).  
Importantly, unlike the other two SFON tasks, the Choice task is the only task that 
allows for an assessment of SFON for large sets. Whereas the imitation task would be too 
cumbersome if children were expected to imitate as many as 5-10 actions, and the picture 
task requires a specific enumeration of a large set of objects which may be taxing for the 
child, the choice task allows children the opportunity to match based upon an 
approximate estimate of the number of items within the set.  
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Thus, across two experiments, we administered three different SFON tasks to 2.5-
5 year old children: the Picture Task (Batchelor et al., 2015), the Mailbox Imitation task 
(Hannula-Sormunen & Lehtinen, 2005) and an Area Choice Task in which number was 
pitted against Cumulative Area. Following these SFON tasks, children were administered 
the Give-N task - a standard measure of children’s number knowledge and cardinal 
understanding (Wynn, 1992). To explore SFON for small and large sets, we manipulated 
the size of the sets presented in the Area Choice task across experiments, such that 
children were presented with exclusively small sets (<4 items) in Experiment 1, and 
exclusively large sets (10-40 items) in Experiment 2. Since the Picture and Imitation 
tasks do not lend themselves to testing SFON for large sets, we manipulated set size only 
on the Area Choice task.  
Our first aim was to examine the relationship between our four SFON measures to 
see 1) whether they were correlated with one another and 2) which measure of SFON 
correlated most strongly with Number Knowledge. Our second aim was to compare 
preschoolers’ SFON for small and large sets by examining whether there were similar 
levels of SFON when presented with small (Experiment 1) and large (Experiment 2) sets 
in the Area Choice task. Given that previous research has shown a strong relationship 
between SFON (when tested with small sets) in the preschool years and number 
knowledge, we assessed whether children’s SFON for small and large sets similarly 
relate to their knowledge of number. If as has been suggested by Hannula-Sormunen and 
collegues (2010), SFON is a generalized attention to number (i.e., regardless of what 
number) then we should expect 1) similar levels of SFON for small (Experiment 1) and 
large sets (Experiment 2) and, 2) a child’s actual knowledge of number (i.e. whether they 
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are a Subset- or CP- knower) should be similarly related to performance on the small and 
large SFON tasks. On the other hand, if number knowledge does play a role in children’s 
level of SFON, and these two are not as distinct as has been suggested in the literature, 
we may find 1) children to show greater SFON for small compared to large sets in the 
Area Choice task, and, 2) children’s number knowledge should only relate to SFON in 
cases in which the child is able to enumerate the sets involved. That is, CP knowers, who 
are able to count and have knowledge of number words for small and large sets, may 
show SFON for both small and large sets, but Subset knowers may only demonstrate 




Participants were 118 preschoolers (Range 2.5-5.1 year olds; Mean age = 3.65, 
SD = .65, 73 Female). An additional 6 participants were excluded for experimenter error 
(n = 3) or for only completing a single task or less (n = 3). Of our 118 participants, 66 
participants completed all four of our tasks with the rest of our participants completing at 
least 2 or more of our tasks (See Table 3.1 for a breakdown of participants included in 
each task). Given that a substantial number of participants were not able to complete all 
tasks, many of our analyses will look at a subset of participants.  
Participants were recruited from the Greater Boston Area and either participated 
in lab or at their preschool or after school program. Of the 56% of our sample that 
provided demographic information, 86% of families identified as Caucasian, 5% as 
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Asian, and 9% as biracial. Furthermore, 98% of mothers and 83% of fathers responded as 
having completed a Bachelor’s Degree or higher. 







Picture Task 106 12 (1) N = 10 (2) N = 2 
3.66  
(2.5 - 5.1) 
3.60  
(2.5 - 4.8) 
Area Choice 
Task 105 13 
(1) N = 4 
(2) N = 9 
3.69  
(2.5 – 5.1) 
3.37  
(2.5 - 4.3) 
Mailbox Task 99 19 (1) N = 17 (2) N = 2 
3.68  
(2.5 - 5.1) 
3.49  
(2.5 - 4.5) 
Give-N 97 21 (1) N = 12 (2) N = 9 
3.66  
(2.5 - 4.9) 
3.60  







Participants completed four different tasks in the following order: Picture Task, 
Area Choice Task, Mailbox Imitation Task, and the Give-N Task7. The Give-N task was 
presented last because it is a measure of number knowledge and we did not want to cue in 
the participants that we were assessing number until after all the SFON tasks were 
administered.  
																																																								
7 Participants completed a fourth SFON task, the Proportion Choice Task, that was 
identical to the Area Choice task, except that the alternative (non-number) feature for 
participants to match on was the proportion of red to blue items in the display. This task 
was completed between the Mailbox Imitation Task and the Give-N Task. Since 
participants performed very poorly on this task – only 30 participants performed above 
chance on the standard trials – we will not include this task in the rest of this dissertation. 
 
Table 3.1. Participant Exclusions Experiment 1.  
Exclusions were divided into two categories: (1) experimenter errors or errors with 
equipment (video cameras, computers etc.) or (2) a failure on the participant’s part to 
finish the task (for the Area Choice task, participants needed to complete more than 
2/3 of Probe trials to be included, for all other tasks participants needed to complete 
all trials to be included. 
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Tasks & Procedure 
Picture Task. Adapted from Batchelor, Inglis, & Gilmore (2015). Children were 
presented with three cartoon pictures taken from children’s books, presented on 
laminated cardboard (21 x 21 cm). The pictures were chosen because they were fairly 
simple pictures that clearly contained small sets of items, in a numerical range (1-4 items) 
that children could attend to and have a verbal label for. The pictures also contained 
many different colors, shapes, and animal characters, providing many other options to 
label and talk about, other than number.  
Children were given three opportunities to talk about each of three pictures, in a 
set order. The experimenter introduced the task by saying: “This game is all about 
pictures. I am going to show you a picture and I want you to tell me everything you can 
see in the picture. Are you ready?” The researcher then put the first picture in front of the 
child and asked “What do you see in this picture?” When the child was finished talking, 
the experimenter prompted the child twice more saying: “Great! What else do you see?” 
After the final, third prompt, the researcher moved onto the next picture. Children were 
given 3 prompts to talk for each picture (unlike the original version, which provided only 
a single opportunity; Batchelor et al., 2015) because pilot testing revealed the additional 
prompting helped children overcome their initial shyness and reluctance to talk. If, after 
any of the prompts, the child said they did not see anything else in the picture, the 
experimenter moved onto the next picture.  
Area Choice Task. Adapted from Cantlon, Safford, & Brannon (2010). The aim 
of this tasks was to measure which of two quantitative dimensions, number vs. 
cumulative area (CA), children would spontaneously use in a delayed match-to-sample 
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task on a tablet. Children were first shown a single sample stimulus in the center of the 
tablet screen and were told: “I want you to look at this picture very carefully and when 
you are done remembering the picture, I want you to touch it.” If the child seemed 
reluctant to touch the tablet on the first few trials, the experimenter would prompt the 
child again or touch the tablet for them if they indicated they were done remembering the 
picture. Next, participants were shown two options and were asked: “Which picture best 
matches the one you just saw? This picture, or this one?” The experimenter would point 
to or circle each picture, to make it explicit what the two options were. The task was self-
paced, meaning participants could choose when to move on from the sample stimulus and 
take as much time as needed to make their choice. Instructions were only repeated on the 
first few trials or whenever participants became distracted and needed re-prompting. At 
no point were children given any explicit instructions on how they should match the 
pictures. 
This task included two types of trials. In Standard trials, one of the two choice 
stimuli matched the sample stimulus on both dimensions (i.e., number and CA; the 
correct match), while the other choice stimulus did not match on either of the two 
dimensions (incorrect match). In Standard trials, children were rewarded only for 
choosing the ‘correct match’, in this case a positive auditory and visual stimulus played 
on the tablet. Choosing the ‘incorrect match’ resulted in a red ‘x’ appearing on the screen 
with no auditory stimulus. In Probe trials, one of the choice stimuli matched the sample 
in terms of number, but not on CA (number match), while the other stimulus matched the 
sample in terms of CA, but not on number (area match). In Probe trials, participants were 
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To familiarize participants with the task, they were first shown 6 Standard trials 
(referred to as ‘Practice trials’), followed by 12 Test trials (a randomized mix of 6 new 
Standard trials and 6 Probe trials). To keep participants motivated, a short (16 secs) 
Standard Trials Probe Trials 
Sample Sample
Correct Match Incorrect Match Number Match Area Match
Figure 3.1. Stimuli from the Area Choice task from Experiment 1.  
For all trials, participants first saw a sample picture, followed by two choice pictures. 
For Standard Trials (left pane), the Correct choice matched the sample on both 
Number and Area and an Incorrect choice matched the sample on neither Number or 
Area. For Probe Trials (right pane), the Number Choice matched the Sample on 
Number not Area, and the Area Choice matched the sample on Area not Number. 
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attractor video played halfway through the task. Thus, the entire task consisted of 18 
trials (6 practice + 12 test), with an attractor video after the first nine trials.  
Stimuli consisted of orange squares randomly placed on a white background (17 x 
11 cm) with the element size of the squares homogenous within displays. For Standard 
trials, the number of items within the sample stimulus consisted of the numbers 1 through 
4 and the CA of the sample items were chosen from one of three possible cumulative 
areas (4800, 8800 and 12800 pixels2), ensuring that each CA was paired with equal 
frequency with each number. For the choice stimuli, the correct match had the same exact 
number of items and CA (and thus the same element area) as the sample stimulus, with 
only the placement of the squares in the display differing between the sample and the 
correct match. To determine the number and CA of the incorrect match we first of all 
ensured that we had all pairwise combinations of the numbers 1 through 4 between the 
sample and incorrect match stimulus (e.g., if the sample had 1 item, the incorrect match 
had 2, 3 or 4 items with equal frequency). This meant that the number ratio between the 
sample and incorrect match stimulus ranged from 0.25 to 0.75. Then to determine the CA 
of the incorrect matches, we took all element sizes generated from the sample stimuli, 
and randomly assigned those across the incorrect matches. In doing so, we made sure that 
1) the size of items for the incorrect match were not identical to those of the 
sample/correct match and 2) the CAs for the incorrect match stimuli were larger than the 
CAs for the sample/correct match stimuli for half of trials and smaller for the other half. 
We decided to choose our incorrect match CA in this way because this would allow for 
the CA ratios between the sample and incorrect choice stimuli to be similar in range 
(Range: 0.38 to 0.73) to the number ratio range of .25-.75. 
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For Probe Trials, the sample stimuli were identical in number and CA as the 
sample stimuli of the Standard trials, with only the placement of the squares in the 
display differing. The Area Choice stimulus was identical in CA to the sample stimulus, 
and the Number Choice stimulus was identical in number to the sample stimulus. Then, 
to determine the number of items in the Area Choice stimulus, and the CA of the Number 
Choice stimulus, we made sure that the ratio of difference between the number of items 
in the sample and area match stimuli was identical to the ratio of difference between the 
CA in the sample and number match stimuli. For example, if the number ratio between 
the sample (e.g., 1 item) and the area match stimuli (e.g., 2 items) was .5, then the CA 
ratio between the sample (e.g., 4800 pixels2) and the number choice stimuli (e.g., 9600 
pixels2) was also .5. For half of the probe trials, the CA of the number choice was greater 
than the sample, while the other half was smaller than the sample (by either multiplying 
or dividing by the given ratio).  
Mailbox (Imitation) Task. Adapted from Hannula & Lehtinen (2005). Materials 
included a small mailbox placed in front of the child and 15 yellow laminated letters 
spread out across the table. Given that we were working with a younger age group than 
previous research using this task, we did some pilot testing and chose to simplify the task 
in several ways. First, children were presented with envelopes all of a single color, rather 
than two different colored sets. We also chose to test children only on very small 
quantities, 1 on the first trial and 2 on both the second and third trial. Lastly, rather than 
placing the letters in a pile, we fanned out all the letters because pilot testing revealed that 
our younger age group had trouble picking up an individual letter when placed in a pile, 
and often accidentally picked up multiple letters without realizing.  
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The experimenter introduced this task by pointing to the mailbox and the letters, 
saying, “This is my mailbox and these are my letters. In this game, I want you to watch 
very carefully what I do, and then I want you to do exactly like I did.” The experimenter 
then proceeded by picking up one letter and putting it in the mailbox, then asking: “Now 
can you do exactly like I did and tell me when you are done?” If the child stopped putting 
letters in the mailbox, but did not tell the researcher that they were done, the 
experimenter would ask “Are you done doing exactly like I did?” waiting for the child’s 
confirmation before proceeding. For both the second and third trial, the experimenter put 
2 letters in the mailbox, each with a separate motion, repeating the exact same 
instructions. To avoid children putting all letters in the mailbox on the first or second 
trial, leaving no letters for the next trial(s), the experimenter always interrupted the child 
after they had put three letters in (a clear indication they were not imitating number) and 
told the participant “Ok, now it’s my turn!” If a child attempted to put envelopes in 
during the experimenter’s demonstration, the experimenter would stop the child and tell 
them “Wait, it is still my turn, it will be your turn next.”  
Give-N Task. Adapted from Wynn (1992). Children were introduced to a pond (a 
small blue basket) and 20 small yellow rubber ducks and were told that the ducks like to 
go into the pond. The experimenter started by showing one duck jumping into the pond, 
and then after removing the duck, asked the child “Can you put one duck into the pond?” 
Once the child was done putting ducks into the pond, the experimenter verified “Is that 
one duck?” If the child said yes, the experimenter went onto the next trial; if the child 
said no, they were given an opportunity to fix what they had done until they were happy 
that there was one duck in the pond. If the child correctly put one duck into the pond, the 
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experimenter asked for larger set sizes, with the number of ducks requested, N, increasing 
from 1-6. Using a titration method, each time the child successfully put N ducks into the 
basket, they were asked for N + 1 ducks, but if the child failed on N ducks, they were 
then asked for N – 1. To reduce the number of trials children had to perform, the 
experimenter skipped the set sizes of 2 and 5 ducks when going up the titration ladder. 
However, if the child failed to correctly place 3 or 6 ducks into the pond, then the 
experimenter asked for 2 or 5 ducks respectively. The task ended when the child: 1) 
succeeded in correctly placing N ducks into the pond twice and failed on N + 1 twice or 
2) succeeded twice on the N = 6 trial.  
Data Processing & Coding  
Picture Task. This task was transcribed using Computerized Language Analysis 
(CLAN), which was made available through the Child Language Data Exchange System 
(CHILDES; MacWhinney, 2000). We used the CHAT (Codes for the Human Analysis of 
Transcripts) transcription format at the utterance level. For each of the three pictures 
(trials), we used CLAN software to perform a frequency count of any number or 
quantity-related words found in the transcripts that were said by the participants. The 
number and quantity words that we searched for included: the number words 1-10, many, 
more, less, little, lot, count, big, and small. As per Batchelor et al., (2015), on each trial 
children received a score of 1 if they used any number or quantity words (regardless of 
how many) and a score of 0 if they did not. Therefore, children could get a maximum 
score of 3 on this task. Twenty percent of participants were transcribed by a second 
coder, frequency analyses of quantity word use were done on these transcripts, and then 
these participants were also given a score 0-3. The level of consistency between both 
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coders’ scores were calculated using linear weighted Kappa, which resulted in a Kappa 
score of .81.  
Area Choice Task. Performance on the Practice trials was not analyzed since 
participants were still attempting to understand the rules of the task. Although 
performance on Standard trials was used to measure participants’ degree of 
understanding of the aim of the task, these trials were not a measure of SFON since 
participants could use number and/or area as a cue for matching. Thus, our only measure 
of SFON in this task was the proportion of number matches on Probe Trials with higher 
scores on the Probe Trials reflecting a greater tendency to match on number rather than 
on the other quantitative dimension (i.e., CA).  
Mailbox Task. As per Hannula and Lehtinen (2005), children were considered to 
have spontaneously focused on number for any trial if participants met any of the 
following requirements: a) they put the same number of letters in the mailbox as the 
experimenter, b) their utterances included number words - regardless of whether they 
were the correct number words -  (e.g., “I am putting in two at the same time”) or 
quantity more generally (e.g., “How many did you put in?”), and/or c) they used 
gestures/fingers to denote numbers. Thus, children are given credit for displaying the 
correct numerical behavior (requirement a) and/or a numerical/quantitative 
verbal/gestural response (requirements b-c). Scores for this task were binary such that 
children scored 1 on a trial if they demonstrated any or all of the above measures of 
SFON, and a score of 0 if they did not. Therefore, children could get a maximum score of 
3 on this task. Twenty percent of participants were coded by a second coder and 
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reliability between the two coders was calculated using linear weighted Kappa, which 
resulted in a Kappa score of .80.  
Give-N. The child’s Give-N score was the highest number of ducks they 
successfully put into the basket8. 
Results  
Individual SFON Measures 
Picture Task. Overall, very few quantity words were produced in this task. On 
average, participants used number words on .97 of the three trials (See Figure 3.2).  
Mailbox Task. Participants focused on number more on this task, with 80.8% of 
participants imitating the number of actions or using number words on at least one trial 
																																																								
8 About three quarters of our participants were tested on an extended version of Give-N 
in which they were asked for N from 1-10. For consistency, we will only be reporting 
participants score as 1-6. For those participants that received the extended version, we 
gave them a score of 6, if 1) they correctly placed 6 ducks into the pond twice or 2) if 
they correctly placed both 6 and 7 ducks into the pond. 
Figure 3.2 Histograms depicting the number of trials on which participants used 
quantity words (Picture Task, left) or imitated number (Mailbox Task, right) in 
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(See Figure 3.2). On average, participants matched on number on 1.71 of the three trials. 
The majority of numerical responses involved correctly imitating the number of actions 
(84% of numerical responses were due to a correct imitation of the experimenter’s 
actions) suggesting higher evidence of SFON on the Mailbox task was due to the fact that 
children were able to give a behavioral response, rather than relying on their verbal skills 
alone (for literature on how emerging knowledge is expressed through behavior before 
speech see (Goldin-Meadow & Breckinridge Church, 1986; Hamamouche, Chernyak, & 
Cordes, under review).   
Area Choice Task. Children performed significantly above chance on Standard 
Trials (65.5%; t(104) = 6.05, p < .001) and on Probe Trials children chose the ‘number 
match’ significantly more often than chance (65.1%; t(104) = 6.76 , p < .001). Thus, 
when number was pitted against area for small sets, children were more likely to attend to 
numerical information, relative to area. Children’s performance on both the Standard and 
Probe trials correlated positively with age (Standard: r = .41, p < .001; Probe: r = .29, p < 
.01; See Table 3.2 for all correlations of Experiment 1). 
Relations between SFON tasks 
Aligning with other work, there were no significant correlations in performance 
on any of our SFON tasks when controlling for age (p’s > .20; See Table 3.2 for all 
correlations of Experiment 2). However, to determine whether the response mode (verbal 
vs. behavioral) could explain why we did not find a correlation between the different 
tasks, we separated those trials in the Mailbox task in which children gave a behavioral 
vs. a verbal response, and correlated those to the other SFON tasks. Not only did verbal 
responses in the Mailing Task correlate positively with the Picture task (r = 0.21, p <.05),  
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behavioral responses in the Mailing task correlated with the Area Choice task for 
Standard (r = 0.22, p <.05), but not Probe trials (r = 0.11, p <.29). This suggests that 
response mode played a significant role in determining how a child performed on each of 
the particular tasks. 
The Relation Between Number Knowledge and SFON Measures 
Children’s performance on Give-N was quite variable (M = 3.65, Range: 0-6) and 
as expected, was highly correlated with age (r = .72, p < .001). Therefore, all analyses 
examining the relation between our SFON tasks and Give-N controlled for age (in 
months). Surprisingly, Give-N performance was only positively correlated with 
performance on one SFON task - the Standard (r = .27, p < .05) and Probe trials (r = .29, 
p < .01) of the Area Choice task when controlling for age. None of the other SFON 
measures correlated with Give-N performance (p’s > 0.3). Follow-up analyses explored 
Variable Age 2 3 4 5 





















4. Mailbox Task .28***  (N=99)    
.003 
(N=83) 
5. Give-N .72***  (N=97)     
Table 3.2. Correlation Matrix Experiment 1.  
The second column with the “Age” heading lists the correlations of each of our tasks 
with age. The rest of the table are pairwise partial correlations between our difference 
tasks when controlling for age. 




whether the relation between Give-N performance and Probe Trial performance on the 
Area Choice task held across knower-levels, or if it was specifically driven by the 
distinction between Subset and CP- knowers. To answer this question, we divided our 
participants in 2 groups: Subset knowers (0-5 knowers) and CP knowers. First of all, 
independent samples t-tests found that both Subset (57.8%; t(51) = 2.46 , p = .02, d = .32) 
and CP knowers (76.5%; t(36) = 7.98 , p < .001, d = 1.29) performed above chance on 
probe trials, yet an ANCOVA comparing performance between Subset and CP knowers 
with Age as a covariate did find CP knowers to be performing significantly better than 
Subset knowers on Probe trials (F(2, 86) = 10.26 , p < .01, ηp2 =.11).   
Next, we determined to what extent performance on the Probe trials held across 
all Subset knower levels (i.e. 0-5 knowers). A step-wise regression model with Age and 
Give-N predicting Probe trial performance was not significant (R2=.06, F(2, 49) = 1.01, 
p=.37).  The fact that the regression model did not hold for all knower-levels, but that 
subset knowers did perform above chance on these probe trials, suggests that it is 
specifically participants’ knowledge of the cardinal principle that related to how strongly 
children paid attention to number in our task. 
Discussion 
Overall, findings from Experiment 1 revealed significant variability across our 
individual measures of SFON in preschoolers. In particular, whereas the Picture task 
revealed near floor performance – likely due to the verbal requirements of the task – 
preschoolers were significantly more likely than chance to match number on both the 
Mailbox task and the Area Choice task. Thus, adding to other work in this domain, results 
of Experiment 1 reveal no consistency in SFON performance across distinct SFON tasks. 
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The findings that verbal SFON on the Mailbox task correlated with SFON in the verbal 
Picture task, and that behavioral performance on the Mailbox task correlated with 
behavioral performance on the standard trials of the Area Choice task, suggest that 
response mode played a large role in determining the extent of SFON that children 
demonstrated across these three tasks. Otherwise, we saw no correlations between tasks 
that had different response modes (i.e. no correlations between the Picture and Area 
Task). These various SFON tasks, that have all traditionally been used to measure SFON 
therefore may measure distinct aspects of a child’s cognition (i.e. fluency with language), 
either separate from or in addition to measuring SFON.  
Interestingly, we also found that despite prior reports relating SFON in these 
different tasks with counting and later math ability, our findings revealed that the only 
SFON measure that related to our measure of a precursor to formal math - Give-N 
performance - was the Area Choice Task. In particular, children’s mastery of the cardinal 
principle – not their number knowledge per se - significantly related to their tendency to 
demonstrate an attention to number in the Choice task. Although, it is not clear why only 
one of the tasks – the Area Choice Task - correlated with children’s cardinal knowledge, 
given that this task may have been the least ambiguous of them all, it seems possible that 
the Area Choice task was simply the most straightforward task in measuring SFON. 
Experiment 2 
All of our SFON tasks in Experiment 1 presented children with sets of items in 
the small number range (< 4 items), replicating prior SFON studies where children were 
likely able to easily quantify the set sizes present. In Experiment 2, we examined SFON 
for large sets of items, specifically exploring whether this positive correlation between 
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cardinal knowledge and SFON is exclusive to small sets or holds across all set sizes. If 
SFON is a truly general numerical construct, then we should see comparable levels of 
SFON for large sets as we do for small sets. Moreover, cardinal knowledge should also 
correlate with SFON for large sets – just as it does for small sets.  
In Experiment 2 we presented children with large sets of items (10-40) in the Area 
Choice Task. Since measuring SFON via the Picture and Mailbox tasks is less conducive 
to large sets (doing so would be cumbersome and taxing for the child), we continued to 
present participants with small sets for these two SFON tasks.  
Methods 
Participants 
Participants were 103 2.5 – 5.1 year olds (Mean age = 3.70, SD = .78, 52 
Females). An additional 5 participants were excluded for experimenter error (n=1), 
parental interference (n=1), or failure to complete more than one task (n = 3). Of our final 
sample of 103 participants, 74 participants completed all 5 tasks, with the rest completing 
a subset of the tasks (See Table 3.3 for a breakdown of participants included in each 
task). Of the 45% of participants that provided us with demographic information, 74% 
identified as Caucasian, 8% as Asian, and 8% as biracial. Furthermore, 93% of mothers 
and 91% of fathers completed a Bachelor’s Degree or higher. 
Design 
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Participants completed four tasks in the following order: Picture Task (identical to 
Experiment 1), Area Choice Task (same structure as Experiment 1 with new stimuli), 





Tasks & Procedure 
All tasks were identical to Experiment 1 except for stimuli in the Area Choice 
Task: 
Area Choice Task. The procedures for this task were identical to Experiment 1, 
but the set sizes involved were larger and stimuli involved sets of purple squares (See 
Figure 3.3). To match the parameters to that of Experiment 1, for Standard trials, the 
number of items within the sample stimulus were increased 10-fold from Experiment 1 
																																																								
9 Since we found that participants performed very poorly on the Proportion Choice Task 
in Experiment 1, we made some modifications on this task for Experiment 2 in an attempt 
to make it easier, as well as including a second Proportional Reasoning Task. However, 
even with these modifications, participants continued to performed below chance on both 
these tasks and therefore we have excluded both tasks from further analyses. 







Picture Task 92 11  
(1) N = 6 
(2) N = 3 
(3) N = 2 
3.77  
(2.5 – 5.1) 
3.12  
(2.5 – 4.1) 
Area Choice 
Task 96 7 
(1) N = 1 
(2) N = 6 
3.72  
(2.5 – 5.1) 
3.51  
(2.5 – 5.0) 
Mailbox Task 100 3 (1) N = 2 (2) N = 1 
3.70  
(2.5 – 5.1) 
4.04  
(2.7 – 5.1) 
Give-N 96 7 (1) N = 2 (2) N = 5 
3.75  
(2.5 – 5.1) 
3.21  
(2.5 – 4.1) 
Table 3.3 Participant Exclusions Experiment 2.  
Exclusions were divided into three categories: (1) experimenter errors or errors with 
equipment (video cameras, computers etc.), (2) a failure on the participant’s part to 
finish the task (for the Area Choice task, participants needed to complete more than 2/3 
of Probe trials to be included, for all other tasks participants needed to complete all 
trials to be included) or (3) interference from the parent (e.g. telling the child how to 
complete a task). 
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and consisted of the numbers 10, 20, 30 and 40 and the CAs for the sample stimuli were 
chosen from the following three possible CAs: 7200, 13200 and 19200 pixels. The CA’s 
were larger than Experiment 1 to account for the fact that the number of items increased 
and we wanted to make sure no individual item was so small that they would become 
difficult to individuate by the participant. Our design manipulations for the correct and 
incorrect match stimuli were identical to Experiment 1: the correct match stimulus had 
the same exact number of items and CA as the sample stimulus and for the incorrect 
match, the number ratio between the sample and incorrect match stimulus still ranged 
from 0.25 to 0.75 and the CA ratios ranged between 0.38 to 0.73. Probe trials were 
designed in the exact same way as Experiment 1 but using the new set sizes and CAs. 
Figure 3.3. Stimuli from the Number vs. Area task from Experiment 2.  
The procedure was identical to the Number vs. Area task from Experiment 1. The 
stimuli were changed such that the number of items in each display in Experiment 1 
were multiplied by 10, thus creating large sets (ranging from 10-40 items). 
Standard Trials Probe Trials 
Sample Sample
Correct Match Incorrect Match Number Match Area Match
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Data Processing & Coding  
All tasks were scored identically to Experiment 1. For the Picture and Mailbox 
task, data from 20% of participants were transcribed and/or recoded by a second coder 
and reliability between the two coders was calculated using linear weighted Kappa which 
resulted in Kappa values of .93 and .87 for the Picture and Mailbox task respectively.  
Results  
Measures of SFON 
Picture Task. Similar to Experiment 1, there were very few number words used 
on this task, with participants using number words on only .79 of the three trials on 
average (See Figure 3.4). However, unlike Experiment 1, we did find a significant 
correlation between number word usage on this task and age (r = .34, p < .001; See Table 
3.4 for all correlations for Experiment 2). 
Figure 3.4. Histograms depicting the number of trials on which participants used 
quantity words (Picture Task, left) or imitated number (Mailbox Task, right) in 








































Mailbox Task. SFON on the Mailbox task was again higher than that of the 
Picture task, with 72% of our participants imitating number on one or more trials (See 
Figure 3.4). On average, participants matched on number on 1.41 of the 3 trials. Similar 
to Experiment 1, it appears that better performance on the Mailbox task was driven by 
children’s behavioral nonverbal responses (93.9% of SFON scores were behavioral, not 
verbal). Similar to the Picture task, here too performance was correlated with age (r = 
.21, p = .03).  
Area Choice Task. Even in the context of large sets, participants performed 
significantly above chance on Standard trials (57.8%; t(95) = 2.83, p < .01, d = .22). 
However, participants were not more likely than chance to select the number match on 
Probe trials (50.2%; t(95) = .09 , p = .93, d =.009). Therefore, although children were 
able to make a match when both area and number were confounded in Standard trials, 
Variable Age 2 3 4 5 
























4. Mailbox Task .21* (N=100)    
.08 
(N=93) 
5. Give-N .74*** (N=96)     
Table 3.4. Correlation Matrix Experiment 2.  
The second column with the “Age” heading lists the correlations of each of our tasks 
with age. The rest of the table are pairwise partial correlations between our 
difference tasks when controlling for age. 
 *p< .05, **p<.01*** p<.005 
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when number was pitted against area in the Probe trials, number did not continue to be a 
salient cue for matching. This suggests that for large sets participants no longer 
demonstrated a clear reliance on number and instead showed no preference for either 
number or area. This could either mean that some participants matched on number and 
others matched on CA – in which case we would expect to see a bimodal distribution of 
results – or, alternatively, that participants responded randomly and did not have a 
consistent strategy – in which case we would expect an approximately normal 
distribution. A histogram of the number of children choosing number at different levels 
(see Figure 3.5) was found to be fairly normally distributed suggesting that most children 
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poor performance on Probe trials we did find age to correlate positively with performance 
on the Standard but not the Probe trials (Standard: r = .39, p < .001; Probe: r = .08, p = 
.44). 
Relations between SFON tasks 
There were no significant correlations between any of our SFON tasks when 
controlling for age (p’s >.05; see Table 3.4). As in Experiment 1, we separated those 
trials in the Mailbox task in which children gave a behavioral vs. a verbal response to 
determine the extent to which task demands may have played a role in performance on 
these SFON tasks. Again, verbal responses in the Mailing Task correlated positively with 
performance on the Picture task (r = 0.26, p <.05), however the behavioral responses did 
not correlate with any of the SFON tasks (p’s > .25).  
Number Knowledge and SFON 
Performance on our Give-N task was again highly variable (M = 4.13, Range: 0-
6) and was again strongly correlated with age (r = .74, p < .001). In contrast to 
Experiment 1, we found no correlation between any of our SFON tasks and number 
knowledge when age was controlled for (p’s > .10). This suggests that while number 
knowledge correlated with children’s spontaneous focusing on number in the Are Choice 
Task when sets were small, this was not the case with large sets.  
However, although the relationship between Give-N performance and SFON 
performance does not hold across all knower-levels, it is possible that we do see a 
different pattern of performance based on whether participants were Subset or CP- 
knowers. Breaking our participants down into Subset knowers (0-5 knowers) and CP 
knowers, we found neither Subset (46.8%; t(49)=1.08, p =.29, d = -.15) or CP knowers 
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(54.3%, t(39)=1.23, p =.23, d = .19) matched based on number above chance, nor did 
Subset and CP knowers differ significantly in their performance on Probe trials 
(t(88)=1.65, p =.10, d = .33) .  
Discussion 
Mirroring findings of Experiment 1, our four measures of SFON revealed no 
consistency within participants. Although we did find that verbal responses in the 
Mailing Task correlated positively with performance on the Picture task, none of our 
other SFON measures were correlated with one another. Again, these findings suggest 
that these four tasks measure distinct aspects of a child’s cognition, and not a singular 
pure construct of SFON. These findings raise questions regarding the validity of these 
measures in assessing children’s SFON since tasks demands in particular seem to play a 
role in the level of SFON preschoolers demonstrate. 
In contrast to Experiment 1, when presented with large sets in the Area Choice 
Task of Experiment 2, children 2.5 – 5 years of age did not focus on number over 
cumulative area more than chance. Given that children, of all knower levels, should have 
easily been able to discriminate between the large numbers we presented them 
(preschool-aged children have been shown to discriminate a 3:4 of change, the hardest 
ratio tested here; Odic, Libertus, Feigenson, & Halberda, 2013), this finding suggests that 
a lack of focusing on number cannot be explained by an inability to discriminate the 
numerosities presented. Instead these findings lead us to conclude that when sets are 
large, number becomes less salient to children with less number knowledge. Notably, 
although children did not select the numerical match at above chance levels, they also did 
not select the area match at above chance levels either. Thus, it is not the case that 
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children found area to be more salient in the context of large sets, but simply that number 
was not a salient dimension.  
Furthermore, we also did not see a relationship between children’s preference for 
number in the context of large sets (Area Choice Task) and their cardinal knowledge. 
Combined with findings from Experiment 1, this suggests the possibility that SFON may 
not necessarily be an independent construct of numerical attention in general, but instead 
may reflect a child’s ability to attend to numbers that s/he can quantify in the world 
around her/him. When tested only on small sets, those children with greater number 
knowledge focused on number. However, when tested on large sets – sets that went 
beyond the scope of children’s number knowledge – we no longer saw this relationship 
between children’s knowledge of number words and their SFON. A direct comparison 
between our findings in Experiment 1 and 2, may be able to tell us more about this 
different pattern of results for Small and Large sets. 
Combined Analyses Experiment 1 & 2 
Before analyzing the effect of set size (i.e. Experiment) on SFON, we wanted to 
verify that there was no significant difference between participants in either Experiment 
in age or Give-N performance and found this not to be the case (p’s >.5). We ran an 
ANCOVA with Age as a covariate comparing performance on the Standard trials of the 
Area Choice Tasks in Experiments 1 and 2 and found a significant effect of Experiment 
(F(1, 197) = 5.51 , p = .02, η =.03), with participants performing significantly better on 
Standard trials when presented with small (65.5%) compared to large (57.8%) sets. A 
similar analysis on probe trial performance similarly revealed that participants were 
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significantly more likely to select the number match on probe trials when presented with 
small (65.1%) compared to large sets (50.2%; F(1, 197) = 22.58 , p < .001, ηp2 =.10)10. 
Given that previous studies found that children perform better on trials where the 
sample stimulus contained only a single item (1-item arrays; Cantlon et al., 2010), we 
wanted to verify that our previous findings showing better performance on small sets was 
not driven by those trials that included 1 item in the sample. Thus, we reran the above 
analyses excluding trials that included 1 item in the sample for Experiment 1 and those 
matched trials in Experiment 2 that included 10 items in the sample.  An ANCOVA with 
Age as a covariate found no significant difference in performance on small (62.0%) and 
large sets (57.0%) for standard trials (F(2, 197) = 1.80 , p = .18, ηp2 =.01), although 
participants continued to be significantly more likely to select a number match on probe 
trials when presented with small (66.3%) compared to large sets (52.3%; F(2, 195) = 
17.65 , p < .001, ηp2 =.08)11. Thus, performance on the Standard trials of the Area Choice 
Task of Experiment 1 may have been slightly boosted by performance on trials involving 
a single item – likely because those trials included the largest ratio difference of 1 vs 4, 
making it easiest for children to notice numerical changes. However, importantly, Probe 
trial performance was unaffected by the exclusion of single item trials, suggesting that the 
pattern of greater numerical matching in Experiment 1 compared to Experiment 2 was 
not driven by single-item trials, but instead by the distinction in set sizes.  
Next, we ran a regression to test to what extent performance on the Probe trials 
was dependent on Age, Set Size (Experiment 1 vs Experiment 2), and Number 
Knowledge (Give-N; see Table 3.5). Age, the two predictors (Experiment and Give-N) 
																																																								
10 These findings held when Give-N was used as a covariate instead of Age, p’s <.01 
11 This pattern of results held when Give-N performance was used as a covariate. 
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and their interaction was entered into a step-wise regression model and the model was 
significant (R2=.18, F(4, 174) = 9.31, p < .001). We found that better number knowledge 
was associated with better performance on the probe trials (b = .045, SEb =.014. ß = 38, p 
< .01) and there was also a significant interaction (b = -.05, SEb =.02. ß = -37, p < .05) 
consistent with our finding that the effect of Number Knowledge on Probe trial 
performance was dependent on Set Size (i.e. Experiment). In particular, when presented 
with small sets (Experiment 1) each increase in Knower Level resulted in a .05 increase 
in performance on Probe trials. We reversed our dummy coding of the Experiment 
Figure 3.6. Scatterplot displaying the relationship between participants’ Number 
Knowledge (measured through Give-N task) and their percentage choosing the 
number match on the Number vs. Area Task (using unstandardized residuals), when 
controlling for age on Experiments 1 and 2.  
























































































































●Small − Experiment 1 Large − Experiment 2
	100	
variable to determine whether Number Knowledge was still significant for large Sets 
(Experiment 2), and found this was not the case (b = .01, SEb =.02. ß = .09, p = .48). This 
confirms previous findings indicating that Number knowledge only had an effect on 
Probe trial performance, when the Probe trials included small sets (See Figure 3.6)12. 
  
																																																								
12 A third experiment was conducted with adults, testing them on the Pictures Task and 
the Small and Large version of the Area Choice task, along with a few measures of math 
abilities. This Experiment generally showed high levels of SFON on all tasks, although 
again a significantly greater likelihood of selecting the number match for small, 
compared to large, sets. See Supplementary materials for a full report of Experiment 3.  
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Variable B Std. Error ß t p R2 R2 change 
Step 1      .02 .02 
   Age .05 .03 .14 1.84 .07   
Step 2      .16 .14 
   Age -.01 .03 -.04 .34 .74   
   Experiment -.16 .03 -.33 4.70 <.001   
   Give-N .03 .01 .25 2.42 <.05   
Step 3      .18 .02 
   Age -.004 .03 -.01 .12 .90   
   Experiment -.01 .08 -.03 .18 .86   
   Give-N .05 .01 .38 3.19 <.01   








Table 3.5. Regression with Probe Trials as our dependent measure. Experiment 1 (Small sets) was coded as 0, and Experiment 2 (Large 
sets) was coded as 1.  
*p< .05, **p<.01*** p<.005 
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General Discussion 
The aim of the current study was to examine the relationship between four 
different SFON measures that have been used in the literature to determine 1) whether 
these measures were correlated with one another and 2) which measure of SFON 
correlated most strongly with Number Knowledge. Secondly, we were interested in 
comparing preschooler’s SFON for small and large sets by examining whether there were 
similar levels of SFON when presented with small (Experiment 1) and large (Experiment 
2) sets in the Area Choice task. Given the evidence showing that SFON, tested in the 
preschool years, is predictive of later long-term measures of math achievement (Hannula-
Sormunen et al., 2015, 2010; McMullen et al., 2015), it is important that we get a better 
understanding of what the limits of SFON are to further our understanding of its 
relationship with other numerical and mathematical abilities.  
Our first research question pertained to how performance on different SFON tasks 
may be related, allowing us to measure how context and task demands affects children’s 
tendencies to pay attention to number. We tested children on three different tasks 
(Imitation Task, Picture Task, and Number vs. Area Choice Task) and found that none of 
our SFON tasks correlated with one another (controlling for age). The only exception was 
that when breaking down performance on the Mailbox task down by whether children 
had given a verbal or behavioral response, verbal responses alone correlated with Picture 
task performance in both Experiment 1 and 2, and the behavioral responses correlated 
with the Area Choice task in Experiment 1 only. These findings therefore replicate to 
some extent previous research showing that performance on the Picture and Imitation 
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tasks as a whole do not correlate with one another (Batchelor et al., 2015; Rathé et al., 
2016).  
Instead, these findings suggest that the difference in response modes of the three 
tasks may play a role in the level of SFON children show. Although the Picture Task 
relied entirely on verbal expression of numerical information, the Mailbox task allowed 
children to express their attention to number either verbally or through behavioral 
imitation. Our finding that only verbal responses, but not behavioral responses, in the 
Mailing task correlated with Picture task performance, and that verbal responses made up 
a very small percentage of numerical responses in the Mailing task (in Experiments 1 and 
2 respectively, 84% and 93.9% of numerical responses were behavioral, not verbal), 
suggests that the verbal nature of the Picture Task may hinder children’s expression of 
SFON. It seems likely that being able to talk spontaneously about number is a skill that 
develops after the ability to imitate or act using number (as in the Mailbox or Choice 
Task). This is in line with other literature on children’s use of gesture for example, 
showing that while children may not verbally be able to express any emerging knowledge 
or skills that they are learning, they may be able to express it using a behavioral mode 
like gesture (Goldin-Meadow & Breckinridge Church, 1986). In fact, when adult 
participants (who are significantly more verbal than children) were asked to perform the 
same SFON tasks (see Supplementary materials for Experiment 3, our adult participants), 
we found adults were significantly more likely to talk about number than our child 
participants, suggesting that the verbal limitations of the task may have played a role in 
the low numerical performance. As such, on top of measuring SFON, the different SFON 
tasks may also capture individual differences in other basic cognitive skills related to 
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response mode. One way to investigate this possibility would be to include a test of 
children’s verbal abilities in future studies using the Picture task to determine to what 
extent children’s verbal proficiency may impact their ability to display SFON in this task.  
Another, non-mutually exclusive possibility for why participants performed so 
differently on these different tasks is that the different SFON measures may not measure 
the same underlying SFON construct. When we take a look at the three existing measures 
of SFON and what they have in common and where they differ, it becomes clear that 
there seem to be some discrepancies in what they are measuring. For example, it is 
unclear what role accuracy plays in SFON. In the Mailbox task (apart from the rare case 
where children used number words during the task) the measure of SFON is also an 
accuracy measure. Children who may have been attending to number, but fail to 
accurately imitate the correct number of actions, would not be considered to be engaging 
in SFON. While this is also the case in our Choice task, it was less of an issue because 
the particular numbers presented were expected to be within the range of values that 
children can track and compare using basic estimation abilities (Halberda & Feigenson, 
2008). On the contrary, in the Picture task, regardless of whether children’s number word 
use refers to the correct amount, as long as they use number words, they are given credit 
for engaging in SFON. Although, this was not an issue in our study (since participants 
attended less to number overall on the Picture task), this may be masked by the high 
verbal demands of this task.  
Our second research question concerned how set size may impact the likelihood 
of a child demonstrating SFON. Prior research has only tested SFON with small sets (<4 
items), sets that preschoolers are typically able to enumerate and have the number words 
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for, making it difficult to determine whether SFON is a general numerical construct, or 
specific to enumerable numerosities. If, as Hannula-Sormunen and collegues (2010) 
claim, SFON is general attention to discrete numerical information, then we should 
expect two things: (1) SFON should vary very little across set sizes and (2) SFON for all 
set sizes, small and large alike, should relate to number knowledge. To explore these 
possibilities, we presented children with an Area Choice Task involving small sets 
(Experiment 1) and large sets (Experiment 2), allowing us to compare levels of SFON 
across set sizes. In contrast to predictions of a single construct of SFON, preschooler’s 
SFON (as measured by probe trial performance on the Area Choice task) for small sets 
(1-4 items) was significantly greater than that for large sets (10-40 items). Moreover, 
regression analyses revealed that number knowledge was only associated with SFON for 
small sets, but not large. 
These findings suggest that children’s number knowledge may play an integral 
role in SFON, at least in the preschool years. Support for this idea comes from research 
suggesting that language plays an important role in solidifying certain concepts, and even 
remembering them across time. For example, in the domain of color, participants perform 
better at color discrimination tasks (Winawer et al., 2007) and have better memory for 
colors (Uchikawa & Shinoda, 1996) when the colors they are tested on have distinct 
linguistic labels (e.g., shades of green vs. blue), compared to when they are part of the 
same linguistic category (e.g., shades of blue). Similarly, in the domain of number, 
societies such as the Amazonian Pirahã tribe that speak a language that does not have 
words to represent exact numerical quantities show deficits in remembering the exact 
cardinality of large sets, suggesting that language for number may be particular useful in 
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terms of memory and attention for number concepts (Frank, Everett, Fedorenko, & 
Gibson, 2008).  
Relating these findings to what we know about SFON, it is possible that in the 
preschool years when children are learning number words, these words allow for the 
encoding of numerical information in their memory, and this improved memory for, and 
awareness of, number may be the primary driver of individual differences in SFON at 
this age. Thus it is possible that at least in the preschool years, SFON when assessed may 
be in part a reflection of a child’s ability to encode number exactly – that is, SFON may 
be better described as a proxy for children’s enumeration abilities - but not their 
spontaneous focusing on any numerical information (i.e., children’s representation of 
large sets). Furthermore, this could mean that findings showing that SFON in the early 
preschool years (Hannula-Sormunen & Lehtinen, 2005) predicts later math ability, may 
be accounted for by the fact that number knowledge predicts later math ability (e.g., 
Libertus, Feigenson, & Halberda, 2011). Future studies should explore whether the 
relationship between SFON and later math abilities holds when controlling for 
differences in number knowledge.  
Importantly however, our findings cannot make any claims about the relationship 
between SFON and enumeration in older children. Since, by the age of 5-6, children 
typically have already mastered the cardinal principle, individual differences in SFON for 
these older children may still reflect a true spontaneous attention to number and/or a 
mastery of verbal counting. Given that we only tested 2.5 – 5-year-olds, an age at which 
children are in the process of learning the meaning of number words and the cardinality 
principle, we cannot make claims regarding SFON for older children.  
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One surprising finding was that we did not replicate previous research showing a 
relationship between children’s performance on the Imitation task (i.e., the Mailbox 
Task) and their number knowledge (Hannula-Sormunen & Lehtinen, 2005; Hannula et 
al., 2007). We believe this can be explained by a difference in our measures of number 
knowledge. Hannula-Sormunen and Lehtinen (2005) measured cardinality using the 
“caterpillar task” which presents children with caterpillars with a different number of 
legs, and they are then asked to bring “just enough” socks for all the legs. This task in 
many ways resembles an imitation or choice task, since children are first presented with 
the quantity (e.g., number of legs) that they then need to imitate (e.g., number of socks). 
On the other hand, our measure of cardinality was the more commonly used Give-N task 
where children are verbally instructed to put a certain number of ducks into a pond, 
however this task cannot be solved through imitation or matching. It is therefore possible 
that the structural similarity between the caterpillar task and the SFON imitation task 
could explain why Hannula-Sormunen and Lehtinen (2005) found a relationship between 
number knowledge and the Imitation task, while we did not.  
In light of our findings, how should we interpret past research showing that SFON 
relates to children’s later arithmetic and math achievement (Hannula-Sormunen & 
Lehtinen, 2005; Hannula-Sormunen et al., 2010)? Although we do not doubt that the 
ability to attend to number plays an important role in children’s numerical development, 
given that preschool-aged children only demonstrate SFON for small sets once they have 
reliably learned how to track number via the counting process, it is clear that acquiring a 
symbolic system (i.e., language) that encodes number plays a very important role in what 
children pay attention to. In fact, we propose that in preschool, SFON is not a truly 
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independent construct from cardinal knowledge and enumeration and that instead it is a 
reflection of an ability to encode exact number (i.e., small sets). In that case, the 
relationship between SFON and later math ability may be driven by the strong correlation 
between number knowledge and math ability. Furthermore, the fact that task demands 
played such an important role in whether or not children demonstrated SFON, further 
supports our hypothesis that SFON as has been tested in the current literature, does not 
seem to be a distinct construct from number knowledge in the preschool years.  
In breaking down how different measures of SFON relate to children’s number 
knowledge, we have gained a better understanding of some of the informal and self-
initiated practices that young children engage in with respect to number and math. We 
hope that this in turn can inspire educators to develop tools and practices that continue to 





Our findings from Experiments 1 and 2 that children are more likely to focus on 
number when presented with small sets compared to large sets, suggest that children may 
pay attention to number when presented with numbers that they know and have number 
words for. If that is the case, then one would expect adults, who are able to enumerate 
and have number words for both small and large sets, to show SFON equally for small 
and large sets. Therefore, in Experiment 3, we tested adult participants on both the small 
and large Area Choice task, so we could determine whether adult participants would 
show differential SFON based on set size. We also tested our adults on the SFON Picture 
Task. In Experiments 1 and 2, we saw no correlation between our Picture task and any of 
the other SFON tasks. Since it is possible that this lack of correlation is due to the fact 
that the Picture task is a verbal task, and therefore is more demanding on children who 
have limited vocabularies, we wanted to compare whether adults would not just show 
higher levels of SFON, but also whether we would see a correlation between adult 
performance on the Picture task and the choice tasks. Lastly, we included two math 
measures for adults to complete. Since previous studies have found that SFON in children 
is predictive of their later math abilities, we wanted to investigate whether this 
relationship may also hold in adults. 
Methods 
Participants 
Twenty-five undergraduate students (Mean age = 19.13, SD = 1.04, 20 Females) 
participated in this study. An apriori power analysis with G*power (Faul, Erdfelder, 
Buchner, & Lang, 2009) indicated that we would need 20 subjects to have 80% power for 
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detecting a difference in performance between the small and large Number vs. Area task, 
with the traditional .05 statistical significance criteria and an effect size of .66 (the same 
effect we found comparing Experiment 1 and 2 Probe trials with our preschoolers). All 
participants completed all tasks, except one participant who did not complete the picture 
task due to experimenter error. 
Design 
Participants completed seven tasks: Synonym Task (a distractor task), Picture 
Task (identical to Experiment 1 and 2), Small Area Choice Task (identical to Experiment 
1), Large Area Choice Task (identical to Experiment 2), Subjective Numeracy Task, 
Math Fluency Task, and Applied Problems. The tasks were completed in the above order 
except that the order of the two Area Choice Tasks (Small vs. Large) was 
counterbalanced across participants.  
Measures 
All tasks were identical to Experiments 1 and 2 except for the following:  
Synonym Task. This task was used as a distractor task. Since some participants 
may have been familiar with the focus of research in our lab (numerical cognition), 
participants were first given a non-numerical task to make it seem as though number was 
not the primary focus of the study.  
The synonym task is subtest from the Oral Vocabulary section of the Woodcock 
Johnson Test of Achievement (Woodcock, McGrew, & Mather, 2001). During this task, 
participants were presented with 9 words and were asked to read the word out loud and 
then to provide a synonym for that word. Since this was a distractor task, performance on 
this task was not recorded. 
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Picture Task. We presented adults with the same 3 pictures, in the same order, as 
Experiments 1 and 2. However, since pilot testing revealed that adults did not need more 
than one prompt to describe the pictures in great detail, we changed the instructions for 
adult participants so that they were given a time limit of 30 seconds to describe 
everything they saw on the picture. We recorded both whether participants used number 
words on each of the three pictures as well as the quantity of number words that were 
used. 
Area Choice Tasks. Participants were presented with both the Small version of 
the task (identical to the Choice task of Experiment 1) and the Large version (identical to 
the Choice task of Experiment 2) separately. Since the task order was counterbalanced 
across participants, adults were given instructions only for the first Area Choice task that 
they completed and these instructions were identical to the instructions given to children 
in Experiments 1 and 2. For the second task, participants were told that they would “do 
another matching task that is a little different”. 
Subjective Numeracy Scale (SNS). To measure participants’ level of confidence 
with mathematical tasks as well as their preference for numerical information over prose 
information, we administered the SNS, a measure that has been validated and found to 
correlate well with objective measure of mathematical achievement (Fagerlin et al., 
2007). This scale presents participants with 8 questions, with the first four questions 
measuring how able and comfortable they are with everyday scenarios that involve 
number or mathematical calculations (e.g. “How good are you with calculating a 15% 
tip?”) and the second set of four questions measures participants’ preference for 
information presented numerically or with prose (“When people tell you the chance of 
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something happening, do you prefer that they use words (“it rarely happens”) or numbers 
(“there's a 1% chance”)). Participants responded on a 1 – 6 scale where low scores (1-3) 
signified less comfort with numerical representations while larger scores (4-6) suggest 
that participants preferred numerical information. A separate score for participants’ 
ability/comfort and preference for number is also calculated. 
Math Fluency Task. This was another subtest of the Woodcock Johnson Test of 
Achievement (Woodcock et al., 2001) and it measured participant’s abilities to solve 
simple arithmetic problems involving addition, subtraction and multiplication. The 
subjects were given a double-sided piece of paper with 160 questions and were given 3 
minutes to complete as many problems as possible. Participants’ accuracy on the 
problems as well as the total amount of problems completed was recorded.  
Applied Problems. We modified this from the Applied Problems subtest of the 
Woodcock Johnson Test of Achievement (Woodcock et al., 2001), a subtest that is 
designed to measure participants’ ability to solve complex word problems. The problems 
are organized in order of difficulty, with the first few questions designed to be 
challenging for children but easy for adults. Therefore, since pilot testing revealed that 
adult participants were performing at ceiling on the first set of questions, to reduce the 
number of questions participants would have to answer, we chose to only test participants 
on the 8 last questions of the test (the 8 most difficult questions). Participants were 
instructed to complete all problems and were told that they would be timed. In our 
analyses, we measured performance both by looking at percent correct as well as the time 
taken to complete the questions. If participants had not completed all problems after 15 
minutes, they were stopped. The questions included real life scenarios that required 
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mathematical computations to complete. An example question is: “Doug works part time 
at a music store. As an employee, he received a discount of 10 percent on all purchases 
he makes. How much does he have to pay for a CD that sells for six dollars and ninety 
cents?” 
Data Processing & Coding  
Since we were interested in examining more generally how adult math 
performance correlated with SFON, but not how any particular math task (Math Fluency 
or Applied Problems) related to SFON, we created a combined Math Score by 
transforming raw scores on the two tasks into z-scores, and then averaging across those 
the z-scores. We used this combined Math score in further analyses 
Results and Discussion 
Measures of SFON 
Picture Task. Of the 23 participants that completed this task, only 2 participants 
did not use number words on all three trials. Given these ceiling effects, it was more 
useful to examine the average quantity of number words used . On average, summed 
across the three trials, participants used 14.74 number words (Range: 6 – 24).  
Area Choice Tasks. For the Standard trials, all participants got 100% of trials 
correct on the Small Choice Task and performed slightly less well, but still significantly 
above chance on the Large Choice Task (93.1%; t(24) = 15.25, p < .001). However, 
performance was significantly better on the Small compared to the Large Choice task 
(t(23) = 2.46, p < .02). Furthermore, for the Probe trials, participants matched on number 
significantly above chance for both the Small (98.6%; t(24) = 50.61, p < .001) and Large 
Choice Task (73.6%; t(24) = 6.82, p < .001), but once again participants were more likely 
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to select the numerical match on the Small compared to the Large Choice Task (t(23) = 
6.66, p < .001). 
Relations between our three SFON Measures. None of our measures of SFON 
were significantly correlated with one another (p’s >.13) 
Measures of Mathematical Ability 
SNS. The maximum score on the SNS was 40 points, indicating a high level of 
comfort with numerical information in everyday situations. On average participants 
scored 26.56 (Range:14-33), which suggests a slight preference for numerical over non-
numerical information in everyday situations.  
Math Fluency. Of the 160 problems, on average participants attempted 133.08 
problems (Range: 96 - 160) in the 3-minute allotted time period, with 4 participants 
completing all 160 problems. When only taking into account the number of problems 
participants attempted, we see that the average performance was very high (95.49%). 
Applied Problems. Participants completed all problems and on average got 
52.08% of problems correct (Range: 25.00 – 75.00%). In terms of time, participants on 
average took 8mins 28secs to complete the 8 problems. 
Relationship between SFON and Mathematical Ability  
There were no significant correlations between our two Choice Tasks and our 
combined Math score. There was however a negative relationship between the quantity of 
number words used in the Picture Task and adult Math performance (r = -.44 p = .03). No 
other significant correlations were found.  
Overall, we find that performance on neither the small or large choice tasks 
correlated with adult math scores. Given our findings in Experiment 1 and 2 that children 
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showed greater SFON when they had more number knowledge (higher Give-N score), we 
expected that since adults have knowledge of both small and large sets, that we would see 
a positive correlation between both the small and large choice task and math ability. 
However, given that adults were at ceiling in the Small Choice task and performing very 
highly on Large Choice task, this may explain why we did not find any correlations here.  
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IMPLICATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
The ability to represent quantities is extremely important for our day-to-day 
functioning. We use our ability to track quantities to judge how much food to buy at the 
grocery store, to notice how fast we are driving, or to determine whether we have enough 
time to finish our favorite TV show. Although many of these actions have become 
automatic to us as adults, how do young infants and children represent quantities in the 
world and how salient are different quantities to them? Furthermore, can adults track 
number alone or must they rely upon cues from continuous quantities as well? These 
questions have been of interest to some of the first developmental psychologists such as 
Piaget, but to this day continue to attract researchers in the field of numerical cognition.  
One reason the nature of our quantitative representations has interested so many 
researchers is that number is the only quantity we learn about extensively through formal 
training in school, and children’s abilities to represent discrete number at an early age is 
predictive of later math achievement (Geary, 2011; Jordan, Kaplan, Locuniak, & 
Ramineni, 2007; Starr, Libertus, & Brannon, 2013b). Furthermore, math achievement has 
been shown to be one of the most important predictors of later academic success (Duncan 
et al., 2007; Romano, Babchishin, Pagani, & Kohen, 2010), yet many children fall behind 
in math achievement in school (Byrnes & Wasik, 2009; Chatterji, 2005; Cross, Woods, & 
Schweingruber, 2009). To develop tools that can help children struggling in math, it is 
important not only that we understand how we represent quantity at an early age, but also 
how these representations of quantity may change throughout development.  
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Aside from discrete number which children are exposed to extensively through 
formal education, there are a variety of continuous quantities that we can also represent 
such as size, cumulative area, time, or density, for example. Furthermore, there is 
naturally strong correlation between discrete and continuous variables such that a basket 
of 10 apples will not only be more numerous than 5 apples, but will also have a larger 
cumulative surface area and will also be more densely packed in a basket. Due to the fact 
that these quantities are so highly correlated with one another, researchers have 
questioned the extent to which we track these quantities independently of one another. In 
particular, proponents of the neo-piagetian “Sense of Magnitude” theory claim that 
because continuous quantities are “perceptual” in nature (they can be represented directly 
from the percept) they must be much easier to track than number, a quantitative 
dimension thought to be tracked independent of perceptual qualities of the display (i.e. 
number is abstract in nature; Gebuis & Reynvoet, 2012; Leibovich, Katzin, Harel, & 
Henik, 2017). Due to this, Sense of Magnitude theorists suggest that young infants who 
have yet to be formally taught about number, should only be able to discriminate 
quantities using continues cues because continuous quantities do not require higher order 
cognitive processes needed to represent abstract number. Then, once infants develop an 
understanding of the correlation between discrete and continuous quantities, often after 
formal education, children and adults learn how to disentangle number from continuous 
quantities. Importantly though, even though older children and adults can use number to 
represent quantity, they will only do this as a last resort. Thus, two important implications 
of this theory are that 1) infants, children and adults should represent number with less 
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accuracy than continuous cues and 2) when presented with both discrete and continuous 
quantities, number should be less salient. 
The aim of this dissertation was to investigate these two implications of the Sense 
of Magnitude theory as a way to determine whether this theory accurately models how 
humans represent quantity at different stages of development. To do this, I presented 
three separate projects, each examining a different stage in development. In Project 1, I 
investigated infant abilities to discriminate continuous quantities (specifically element 
area) and compared these abilities to previous work on infant number discrimination 
abilities. If continuous quantities are easier to represent than number in infancy, then we 
would not only expect infants to discriminate element area with similar (or better) 
precision than number, but we would expect a parallel increase in acuity with 
development, similar to what we see in number. Not only did we replicate previous 
findings showing that 7 month olds cannot discriminate a 1:3 ratio of change in element 
area (when this same age group has successfully discriminate a 1:2 ratio in number; Xu & 
Spelke, 2000) by 12 months of age our infants still failed to discriminate this large ratio 
of change. Thus, not only are infants less accurate at representing element area compared 
to number, but even by 12 months of age, infant element area tracking capacities are not 
anywhere near that of number.  
Next, in Project 2 we continued to investigate human abilities to represent 
continuous quantities by investigating the extent to which discrete quantity may interfere 
with adult’s judgements of continuous quantity. If continuous quantities are truly easier 
to represent and more salient than number, then conflicting numerical information should 
not affect adult abilities to make cumulative area discriminations. In two experiments, we 
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found adult cumulative area discriminations to be similar to that of number – a finding in 
contrast to Sense of Magnitude theorists positing that continuous extent discriminations 
should be relatively more precise than that of number. Moreover, numerical information 
interfered with cumulative area judgements such that as the number of items in the 
display increased, adults performed progressively worse. Together, these findings suggest 
that number is at least as salient as continuous variables and thus, together with our 
findings from Project 1, we have found no evidence to suggest that continuous quantities 
are easier to represent than number.  
Lastly, in Project 3, I addressed the second implication of Sense of Magnitude 
theory which is that continuous quantities should be more salient than number. To 
examine this question of the relative salience of different quantities, I assessed 
preschoolers on Spontaneous Focusing on Number (SFON) tasks, which examine 
children’s tendencies to spontaneously focus on number without being prompted. The 
previous literature on SFON has shown that number is very salient to preschool aged 
children, with levels of SFON correlating with later math achievement (Hannula-
Sormunen & Lehtinen, 2005; Hannula-Sormunen et al., 2010), however few SFON 
investigations have pitted number against another quantitative dimension. In two 
experiments, we found that when number was pitted against cumulative area, preschool 
aged children found number to be more salient than cumulative area but only when 
presented with small sets of items (1-4 items; Experiment 1). Thus, again contradicting 
claims of SoM, we find cumulative area to be less salient than number to young 
preschoolers, at least for small sets. Notably, when presented with larger arrays (10-40 
items; Experiment 2) children showed no preference for either number or cumulative area 
	120	
suggesting that – at least in the preschool period – SFON may simply reflect a child’s 
ability to enumerate particular set sizes. Relating these findings back to Sense of 
Magnitude theory, Project 3 found no evidence to suggest that continuous quantities are 
more salient to children than number. When number was directly pitted against 
cumulative area, preschool aged children did not show a preference for cumulative area; 
in fact, when presented with small sets, children showed a strong preference for number.  
Building on previous work that has investigated how humans at different stages of 
development represent quantity, these three projects demonstrate that discrete number is 
represented more accurately, and is more salient to infants, children and adults than are 
most continuous quantities. These findings, along with previous findings in the numerical 
cognition literature, undermine claims made by proponents of the Sense of Magnitude 
theory stating that humans at all stages of development are better at, and prefer to attend 
to continuous quantities. Instead our findings align more closely with the idea that we are 
born with a “sense of number” (Dehaene, 1997; Feigenson, Dehaene, & Spelke, 2004). 
Evidence for this comes from studies that have tested infants (even newborns, Izard, 
Sann, Spelke, & Streri, 2009) on their ability to discriminate number across visual (Xu & 
Spelke, 2000; Xu et al., 2005) or auditory displays (Lipton & Spelke, 2003), to match 
number across modalities (Coubart et al., 2014; Izard et al., 2009), and to distinguish 
increases in number from decreases in number (Brannon, 2002; de Hevia & Spelke, 
2010).  
An earlier theory proposed by Spelke, in fact suggests that number is one of the 
five core knowledge systems that we are endowed with from birth (Kinzler & Spelke, 
2007; Spelke, 2000, 2003, 2017). Spelke proposed that all humans, regardless of culture, 
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are equipped with five core systems that are innate and evolutionary ancient, that are the 
basis for any other knowledge we may gain throughout our experiences in the world. 
Under this view, our ability to discriminate number from an early age is due to the fact 
that we are born with a core knowledge system for number (an approximate number 
system) that is present across cultures and species. Then, as we are exposed to the natural 
language in our culture, our approximate sense of number develops into a more exact 
sense of number. Importantly though, the extent to which we develop an understanding of 
exact number is fully dependent on our culture and its natural language. That is, while the 
core systems are not unique to humans, the development of an exact numerical 
representation is, and our species is able to develop this ability specifically because we 
are the only species that have a developed language faculty.  
Evolutionary Perspective: why have we developed a sense of quantity 
Why might humans have evolved the ability to track quantity? Taking a look at 
the animal literature may be particularly useful here as it suggests that there are at least 
two important benefits of having a sense of quantity. The first is that it allows human and 
non-human animals to maximize food intake that is crucial for survival. Studies that have 
tested animals on their ability to choose the larger of two sets of foods items have shown 
that dogs (Ward & Smuts, 2007), coyotes (Baker, Shivik, & Jordan, 2011) and 
orangutans (Call, 2000) reliably choose the set that is largest in both number and 
cumulative area. Furthermore, studies that have tried to determine which quantitative cue 
non-human animals use when making quantitative discriminations in food related 
contexts have found that although many animal species can use number alone to make 
food comparisons, they are often biased by other continuous cues that may be present, 
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such as the size of the largest individual item in a set (Chimpanzees: Beran & Rumbaugh, 
2001; Guppies: Lucon-Xiccato, Miletto Petrazzini, Agrillo, & Bisazza, 2015) or even the 
amount of movement of the prey (Salamanders: Krusche, Uller, & Dicke, 2010). 
A second evolutionary important reason for having developed a sense of quantity 
is for the purpose of avoiding predators or hunting for prey. Angelfish will choose the 
larger of two shoals of conspecifics to join because this is more likely to provide safety 
against predators (Gómez-Laplaza & Gerlai, 2011). Female African Lions are less likely 
to approach and contest another social group when they hear calls of three intruding lions 
nearby, as opposed to only one, suggesting that they use number to make assessments 
about the safety of their approach (McComb, Packer, & Pusey, 1994). Similarly, male 
chimpanzees will make their decision on whether to approach based on their relative 
numbers compared to an intruding group of chimpanzees (Wilson, Hauser, & Wrangham, 
2001). Lastly, counting even plays a role in the egg-laying practices of American coots 
(Lyon, 2003). American coots engage in brood parasitism, the practice whereby female 
birds lay some of their eggs in the nests of conspecifics. In protection of their own brood, 
research suggests that coots will count their eggs, discounting ‘parasitic’ eggs, as a way 
to make decisions about how many future eggs to lay. Thus, the ability to visually keep 
track of the number or surface area of the eggs in the nest is crucial for decisions related 
to clutch sizes, which in turn has important consequences for the fitness of the American 
coot. Therefore, it is clear that for social human and non-human animals, representing 
quantity is crucial for survival. Not only does it allow animals to keep track of the 
relative sizes of different social groups, it allows them to make efficient choices when 
hunting for prey, all to ensure the survival of their species. Importantly, in the context of 
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tracking predator/prey relationships, continuous quantities are significantly less important 
than relative number (i.e., the number of approaching lions is more important than the 
duration of their calls), perhaps suggesting that social relationships may underlie the 
evolution of discrete number tracking abilities in humans.  
The role of education in our preference for number 
Even if Spelke’s core knowledge theory is correct and our ability to represent 
number (at least approximate number) is innate, it is likely that the emphasis on number 
in most formal education systems further drives the preference for number later on in 
development. In fact, my finding in Project 3 that children’s knowledge of number was 
correlated with the children’s preference for number over cumulative area suggests that 
children’s preference for and knowledge of number go hand in hand. Furthermore given 
that a myriad of studies continue to find a strong relationship between children’s number 
understanding or counting skills in the preschool years and their later math achievement 
(Aunio & Niemivirta, 2010; Jordan et al., 2007; Jordan, Kaplan, Ramineni, & Locuniak, 
2009), it is not surprising that such a strong emphasis has been put on developing 
counting skills in the United States common core standards for example (Common Core 
Standards initiative, 2010).  
Unfortunately, attention to number early in development can be at the expense of 
other important quantitative information. For example, recent work has revealed 
children’s overt attention to number may compromise their abilities to track non-
symbolic proportional information – a skill necessary for the later acquisition of formal 
fractions (Boyer & Levine, 2015; Boyer, Levine, & Huttenlocher, 2008; Hurst & Cordes, 
2018; Jeong, Levine, & Huttenlocher, 2007). For example, in non-symbolic proportional 
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matching tasks (e.g. the “Wally-Bear Juice Task” in which children have to find the cup 
that has the same proportion of juice/water as a target cup), children are more 
successfully at finding the correct match when the non-symbolic fraction (e.g. 4/6) is 
depicted continuously (e.g. the cup has 2/3 juice and 1/3 water) versus discreetly (e.g. the 
cup would have 4 juice pieces and 2 water pieces; Boyer & Levine, 2015; Boyer et al., 
2008; Hurst & Cordes, 2018). This discrepancy in performance has been attributed to the 
fact that children are biased towards number in discrete situations (they will count the 
pieces) at the expense of proportional information. Although various hypotheses have 
been put forth as to why this bias may exist (e.g. over-emphasis of number in early 
education or under-emphasis of proportional information), it is clear that this strong 
preference for number is not always helpful. It seems therefore that a combination of an 
innate system for number along with our educational system that strongly emphasizes 
number, even to the detriment of developing other quantitative skills, explains why 
humans, from infants to adults, show such a strong preference for number over other 
quantitative information.  
Future Directions: The origin of individual differences in number sense 
 The current dissertation has highlighted just how attuned humans of all ages are 
to number in their environment. Yet, the reality is that there are great disparities in math 
proficiency in children even as early as first grade. This begs the question at what point in 
a child’s formal or informal education, this gap in number and math understanding 
emerges. Only one study has directly examined the relationship between infant’s early 
number sense and how this relates to their mathematical achievement years later, finding 
that number sense at 6 months predicted math achievement at 3 years, even when 
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controlling for general intelligence (Starr et al., 2013b). What this study was not able to 
address, however, is what led to these individual differences at 6 months. Similarly, 
research in the domain of SFON suggests that individual differences in SFON in 
kindergarten was also predictive of mathematical achievement in second grade, although 
again it is not clear what the source of these early individual differences are (Hannula-
Sormunen, 2014; Hannula-Sormunen et al., 2010). One possibility, that we addressed in 
Project 3, is that SFON in the preschool years, may really be a proxy for children’s 
enumeration abilities, and thus perhaps the individual differences we see in SFON are 
really due to individual differences in children’s counting abilities. 
Future work would benefit from examining the source and onset of these 
individual differences, especially given that the ability to discriminate number is present 
even in newborns (Izard et al., 2009). One way to examine this question would be to 
track individual differences in number discrimination throughout infancy. Although we 
know that infants generally follow a steady developmental trajectory of improving in 
their number discrimination such that newborns can discriminate a 1:3 ratio, 6-month-
olds discriminate a 1:2 ratio and 9-month-olds discriminate a 2:3 ratio (Lipton & Spelke, 
2004; Xu & Spelke, 2000), it is unclear whether on an individual basis, infants start off 
with the same number sense at birth, and if infants that fall behind at some point in 
infancy, continue to stay behind in their number discrimination abilities a few months 
later. On the other hand, another non-mutually exclusive possibility is that the difficulties 
we see in math achievement in grade school develop in early childhood when children are 
being exposed to early number skills such as counting in the home and school 
environment. In fact, a myriad of studies have shown that there is a large discrepancy in 
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the quantity and quality of math talk in the home and at school (Elliott, Braham, & 
Libertus, 2017; Gunderson & Levine, 2011; Klibanoff, Levine, Huttenlocher, Vasilyeva, 
& Hedges, 2006; Rowe, Levine, Suriyakham, Gunderson, & Huttenlocher, 2010). 
Another possibility is that differences in the exposure to number and counting skills in 
the home and school already has an effect on young infant’s development of a number 
sense, and that this delay in reaching number discrimination milestones, affects their later 
math achievement. As such, it is not clear from the current research when these individual 
differences first occur which makes implementing successful interventions difficult.  
Conclusion  
In conclusion, this dissertation examined infant, child, and adult abilities to 
represent continuous quantities and the relative saliency of these continuous quantities 
compared to number. Not only did I demonstrate that infants and adults are poor at 
discriminating continuous quantities, adult representations of continuous quantities were 
affected by the presence of numerical information, suggesting that number is at least as 
salient as continuous quantity. Lastly, when pitted against each other, preschool aged 
children preferentially attended to number over continuous quantities. By examining 
these questions across development, and in combination with previous findings in the 
literature, I have shown not only that humans are not very accurate at representing 
continuous quantities but also that they do not find those perceptual cues to be 
particularly salient in their environment, undermining claims made by the prominent 
Sense of Magnitude Theory (Gebuis & Reynvoet, 2012a; Leibovich et al., 2017). By 
investigating these questions, I have provided insight into the way we represent and use 
different dimensions of quantity in our day to day lives, helping us understand how 
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individual differences in the salience of these early representations may affect the way 
children and adults perform on tests of mathematical achievement in later life.   
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